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INTRODUCTION

An examination of first amendment constraints in the operation of public elementary and secondary schools requires a multifaceted analysis. The local school boards and other state agencies
responsible for public education are invested with public policy interests of such magnitude - even constitutional in scope - that
they rightfully demand a broad margin of autonomy against the
claims for first amendment protection asserted by teachers, parents, and students. Many of their claims, however, are of great importance and they must be recognized and upheld. Commentators
typically have weighed specific constitutional claims of parents,
students, and teachers only against the relevant countervailing interests asserted by public school administrators' and have not focused on conflicts among first amendment rights. The inconsistencies between the teacher's academic freedom and the student's
right not to have offensive religious materials imposed on him, for
example, need to be evaluated, and to the extent possible, resolved.
This article searches for resolutions of constitutional conflicts, not
only between the state as public school administrator and individual students, parents, and teachers, but also among the competing
1. E.g., Goldstein, The Asserted Constitutional Right of Public School
Teachers to Determine What They Teach, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 1293 (1976); Strossen, "Secular Humanism" and "Scientific Creationism":Proposed Standardsfor
Reviewing CurricularDecisions Affecting Students' Religious Freedom, 47 OHno
ST. L.J. 333 (1986).
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constitutional demands of the individuals whose interests are affected by the system of public education.
Part II of this article addresses the public interests and values
in which the educational system is rooted. Part III identifies and
discusses the first amendment rights at stake in public education:
freedom of expression; the right to receive communication; freedom of religion; and the protection against establishment of religion and familial childrearing rights. Part IV contains an elaboration of measures that may be taken to protect or accommodate the
individual constitutional rights at stake; considers the extent to
which these measures may be applicable in the contexts of school
libraries, textbooks and courses of instruction, teacher's lectures
and assignments, and extracurricular activities; and offers resolutions of the competing educational and constitutional claims in accordance with applicable case law.
II.

INTERESTS AND VALUES SERVED

By

PUBLIC SCHOOL

ADMINISTRATIONS

Under the tenth amendment the states have plenary authority
to operate public school systems.2 The most essential objectives of
public education are to prepare youth for citizenship, vocation, and
a satisfactory personal life.3 Compulsory school attendance laws
and child labor laws were enacted at about the same time and for
the same purpose of ensuring a working class adequately trained to
be productive, which would develop an economically strong nation." The functions of public elementary and secondary schools
include the development of individual potentialities; the transmission of the cultural heritage; discovery and systemization of knowledge; development of character; and inculcation of values, beliefs,
and ideals of the social group, enabling the individual "when he
2. Project: Education and the Law: State Interests and Individual Rights,
74 MICH. L. REV. 1373, 1380 (1976) (hereinafter Project); Kemerer & Hirsh, The
Developing Law Involving the Teacher's Right to Teach, 84 W. VA. L. REv. 31, 35
(1981).
3. Garvey, Children and the First Amendment, 57 TEx. L. REV. 321, 344-45

(1978) (children must be equipped to function as autonomous, productive adults
in self-governing society); Hirschoff, Parents and the Public School Curriculum:
Is There a Right to Have One's Child Excused From Objectionable Instruction?,
50 S. CAL. L. REV. 871, 874-75, 877-82 (1977); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221-24
(1982) (education enables youth to obtain good jobs and become good citizens).
4. Hirschoff, supra note 3, at 881 n.30; Tyack, Ways of Seeing: An Essay on
the History of Compulsory Schooling, 46 HARv. EDUC. REV. 355, 377-83 (1976).
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assumes an adult role in society to be economically self-supportive,
socially dependable, politically insightful, and morally selfdirective."5 Most states by statute or regulation impose specific
curriculum requirements directed toward attainment of these
broad educational goals. Almost uniformly, these include the
teaching of certain basic skills - reading, writing, and arithmetic.6
Many states have enacted requirements aimed at achieving a satisfactory personal life, such as instruction on the effects of alcohol,
tobacco, and drugs; sex education; consumer education; and the
teaching of honesty, cooperation, hard work, and punctuality. The
Supreme Court rightfully described public education as "perhaps
the most important function of state and local governments . . .
required in the performance of our most basic public
responsibilities."8
While the Supreme Court has held that a free public education is not a federally protected constitutional right,9 it indicated
that there is some constitutional entitlement to a minimal educational opportunity. 10 The Court also has established that, if the
state provides public education to its citizens, the fourteenth
amendment requires that it be provided equally to resident aliens,
even those illegally present in the country." Additionally, the Supreme Court has ruled that state-provided education is an entitlement of such value that students cannot be suspended or expelled
unless procedural due process requirements are observed. 2
The inculcation of values, beliefs, and ideals of the society is
uniformly recognized as a public educational function of great importance.' 3 By the inculcative model of education, information is
administered to passive students. Since the school authorities are
charged with importing social values, it follows that they must be
empowered to prescribe what values are orthodox. This power
126-27 (1966).
6. Hirschoff, supra note 3, at 880 n.28.
7. Id. at 881-82 nn.32-36.
8. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
9. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973).
10. Id. at 36-37.
11. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
12. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
13. See supra note 5. See also Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free
School Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864 (1982) (legitimate interest in promoting respect for authority and traditional social, moral, and political values);
Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 77 (1979); West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 640-41 (1943).
5. J. SAYLOR, CURRICULUM PLANNING FOR MODERN SCHOOLS
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seems inconsistent with the right to engage in critical inquiry and
debate that is at the heart of the first amendment. Some commentators contend that the proper discharge of the inculcative function of schools essentially does, and should, rule out any freedom
of expression and 14freedom of religious claims on the part of teachers and students.
Other writers prefer an analytic model for public instruction.
They argue that, with appropriate guidance from parents and
teachers, students ought to be presented with objective information on divergent viewpoints and make decisions for themselves.
Thus stimulated, students develop reasoning abilities and better
prepare themselves for the innumerable choices required in adult
life. 5 The analytic model, of course, is highly conducive to rigorous
protection of first amendment freedoms. In Tinker v. Des Moines
0 the Court expressed approval of the analytic
School District,"
model, saying that schools seek to educate through "wide exposure
to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth out of a
multitude of tongues [rather] than through any kind of authorita7
tive selection.'
A plurality of the Supreme Court embraced the principle in
Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free School District v.
Pico'" that a school board violates the first amendment when it
orders the removal of school library books simply because they dislike the ideas in them. Justice Brennan, in the plurality opinion,
and Justice Blackmun, in his concurrence, expressed acceptance of
both the inculcative and analytic models of public education. 9
Justice Blackmun acknowledged the apparent inconsistency between inculcation and analysis and posed a tough question that is
of central importance in this article: how to reconcile the schools'
inculcative function with the first amendment ban on the prescrip14. J. TUSSMAN, GOVERNMENT AND THE MIND 51-85, 167 n.29 (1977); Diamond,
The First Amendment and Public Schools: The Case Against Judicial Intervention, 59 TEX. L. REV. 477 (1981); Goldstein, supra note 1, at 1342-43.
15. Note, Textbook Adoption Laws, Precensorship, and the First Amendment: The Case Against Statewide Selection of Classroom Materials, 17 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 167, 178-80 (1984); Comment, What Will We Tell the Children? A
Discussion Of Current Judicial Opinion On The Scope Of Ideas Acceptable For
PresentationIn Primary And Secondary Education,56 TUL. L. REV. 960, 962-68
(1981).
16. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
17. Id. at 512.
18. 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
19. Id. at 864-66, 876-77.
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tion of orthodoxy.2
The dilemma posed by Justice Blackmun is significantly dissipated and the apparent conflict between pedagogical and first
amendment goals is substantially diminished, however, when the
underlying purposes served by inculcation are separately examined. First, the great majority of courses taught in the public
schools by their nature are not appropriately the subject of the analytic model of study. The teaching of mathematics, the mechanics
of English, and foreign languages clearly has no place for critical
inquiry and debate. Likewise, at the high school level the physical
sciences essentially involve the study of facts about which there is
not much debate. The life sciences, to a large extent, also use factbased curricula about which there is little disagreement, except for
the fields of health and psychology and with regard to the evolution controversy. Courses consisting of physical activity, like physical education, vocational studies, and music are inappropriate settings for the analytic model. The analytic model has little
relevance then, except in literature, creative writing, drama, and
art courses; health and psychology; and the social sciences - history, political science, sociology, and economics.
Second, the analytic model of instruction requires a certain
degree of maturity on the part of the student. While some materials can be effectively presented in primary schools by means of debate and analysis, this mode of education is more suited for high
school students who have attained higher levels of intellectual and
emotional maturity.
Third, the values which the public schools are expected to inculcate are the same values that form the basic assumptions on
which the analytic model depends.2" These values include individual freedom of choice as expressed in a democratic system of government; freedom of intellectual inquiry in the form of free speech,
free press, and religious freedom; and toleration of ethnic and cultural diversity. On many occasions the Supreme Court has made it
clear that these are the inculcative values which are of the greatest
importance in public education. In Ambach v. Norwick,22 the
Court noted that the state assumes the responsibility to "[incul20. Id. at 879.
21. See Note, State Indoctrinationand the Protection of Non-State Voices
in the Schools: Justifying a Prohibition of School Library Censorship, 35 STAN.
L. REv. 497, 520-23 (1982).
22. 441 U.S. 68 (1979).
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cate] fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system ..... ,1 Justice Frankfurter, concurring in
Wieman v. Updegraff,2" stated, "It is the special task of teachers
to foster those habits of open-mindedness and critical inquiry
which alone make for responsible citizens, who, in turn, make possible an enlightened and effective public opinion.

' 25

The state is

legitimately interested in instilling state-supported values such as
patriotism and adherence to the democratic form of government,
the Court observed in West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette.26 In that case, the Court also said, "That they are educating
the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of
Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle
the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount important
principles of our government as mere platitudes. ' 2 7 The fundamen-

tal values that schools are supposed to teach, according to the
Court in Bethel School District v. Fraser,8 include "tolerance of
divergent political and religious views ...."'9
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that the conflict be23. Id. at 77. "[Tleacher[s] [have the] opportunity to influence the attitudes
of students toward government, the political process, and a citizen's social responsibilities. This influence is crucial to the continued good health of a democracy."
Id. at 79.
24. 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
25. Id. at 196. "They ... [teachers] cannot carry out their noble task if the
conditions for the practice of a responsible and critical mind are denied to them.
They must have the freedom of responsible inquiry, by thought and action, into
the meaning of social and economic ideas, into the checkered history of social and
economic dogma." Id.
26. 319 U.S. 624, 631, 640-41 (1943).
27. Id. at 637. The state may require teaching "'of all in our history and in
the structure and organization of our government, including the guaranties of civil
liberty, which tend to inspire patriotism and love of country.'" Id. at 631.
28. 106 S. Ct. 3159 (1986).
29. Id. at 3164. See Freeman, The Supreme Court and First Amendment
Rights of Students in the Public School Classroom: A Proposed Model of Analysis, 12 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 55 (1984) (schools should be allowed to teach religious tolerance, racial equality and the merits of representative democracy, but to
teach the converse would be impermissible indoctrination); Hirschoff, supra note
3, at 930-34 (basic constitutional provisions need to be understood to function
effectively as a citizen). The relationship of freedom of expression to selfgovernment is developed in the writings of Alexander Meiklejohn. A. MEIKLEJOHN,
FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948); Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79
HARv. L. REV. 1 (1965); Meiklejohn, What Does the First Amendment Mean?, 20
U. CHI. L. REV. 461 (1953).
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1983
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tween the schools' inculcative function and first amendment values
is not so great as might appear upon first impression, but a considerable degree of tension remains between the two. Where conflict
arises, the courts are quite deferential to school boards. The courts
recognize the high public duties carried out by the school authorities and are reluctant to interfere. The courts also recognize that
almost all public schools are controlled by elected local school
boards so that judicial involvement in school affairs impinges on
democratic institutions.3 0 Courts are also inclined against interfering with school operations because educational programs are experimental, ever changing, and locally distinctive, so that the
judges often lack uniform standards against which to evaluate a
particular school action."1 As the Supreme Court stated in Milliken
v.Bradley,32 "[n]o single tradition in public education is more
deeply rooted than local control over the operation of schools; local
autonomy has long been thought essential. . . to the maintenance
of community concern.. . . . [L]ocal control over the educational

process affords citizens an opportunity to participate in decisionmaking, permits the structuring of school programs to fit local
needs, and encourages 'experimentation, innovation, and a healthy
competition for educational excellence.' 33
Yet, judicially cognizable constitutional claims do arise in the
operation of public schools. While the courts should not ordinarily
"intervene in the resolution of conflicts which arise in the daily
operation of school systems," 4 deference to local school authorities
ends when their actions "directly and sharply implicate basic constitutional values." 35

30. Goldstein, The Scope and Sources of School Board Authority to Regulate Student Conduct and Status: A Non-ConstitutionalAnalysis, 117 U. PA. L.
REv. 373 (1969); Project, supra note 2, at 1375-81.
31. Thus, the courts will not second-guess school authorities as to decisions
primarily academic in nature. University of Miss. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978).
32. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
33. Id. at 741-42. See Strossen, supra note 1, at 354; Keiter, JudicialReview
of Student First Amendment Claims: Assessing the Legitimacy-Competency Debate, 50 Mo. L. REV. 25, 26 (1985).
34. Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969).
35. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968).

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol10/iss3/1

8

Smith: Constitutional Rights of Students, Their Families, and Teachers i

19881

FIRST AMENDMENT IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS

III.

INDIVIDUAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN THE PUBLIC
EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

A. Freedom of Expression
In a series of recent cases, the Supreme Court has searched for
principles and limitations to define what circumstances are appropriate for constitutionally protected speech, who possesses the expressive rights, and the range of topics that rightfully can be discussed.36 At one extreme, a public forum, like the parks and streets
to which the Court referred in Hague v. Committee on Industrial
Organization,37 is dedicated to all members of the public for making communications on any subject at any time. At the other extreme, there are places like prisons s and military bases " where
the Court has allowed authorities essentially total control over
public speech.
The public schools fall somewhere in between, sometimes referred to as non-public forums,4 or limited public forums."1 The
present discussion is not concerned with outsiders' claims to use
school facilities for communication purposes, a subject often addressed in the cases; 42 rather, the concern here is with first amendment rights of teachers and students, those for whose use the
schools are established. The Supreme Court has indicated that students and teachers possess constitutionally-protected rights of expression within the schools. The key principle is that once objective criteria are set out by the school authorities, such as the
prescription of a particular course of study, any expression that is
pertinent to the subject is protected4 3 unless the government can
36. E.g., Bethel School Dist. v. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. 3159 (1986); Perry Educ.
Assoc. v. Perry Local Educ. Assoc., 460 U.S. 37 (1983); Widmar v. Vincent, 454

U.S. 263 (1981); Jones v. North Carolina Prisoner's Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S.
119 (1977); City of Madison Joint School Dist. No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976); and
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972).

37. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
38. Jones, 433 U.S. 119.
39. Greer, 424 U.S. 828.
40. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 266-67; Perry, 460 U.S. at 46-47.
41. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267-68; Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 n.7.
42. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972); Widmar, 454 U.S. 263.
43. City of Madison Joint School Dist. No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167, 175 n.8 (1976); Perry, 460 U.S. at 46; Grayned, 408
U.S. at 120.
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1983
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justify the suppression." This principle is a specific application of
the general rule against content-based discrimination in speech.' 5
As the Supreme Court said in Tinker v. Des Moines School District,"6 "[S]tate operated schools may not be enclaves of totalitarianism[,]" where students are exposed to "only to that which the
state chooses to communicate.""' In the words of Justice Brandeis,
the remedy imposed by the First Amendment is "more speech, not
48
enforced silence.'
If the objective criteria which gave rise to the expressive right
are changed, Supreme Court decisions indicate that the student
and faculty speech rights are modified accordingly. 9 If, for example, a course of study is eliminated, the teacher no longer has the
right to teach, nor the student the right to be taught, that subject
except to the extent it falls within conceivable limits of relevance
in other courses.
The state interests that justify public school authorities' suppression of speech 50 principally are the interests in preventing disruption, precluding indecency, and avoiding violation of the establishment clause. Obviously, the school administration has the right
and duty to maintain order and discipline. 51 However, an invocation of this interest does not automatically justify interference with
speech. The debate of ideas may foment discussion or arouse emotions, but that does not rob speech of its constitutional protec44. Traditionally, the government could prevail only by showing that the restriction is required by a compelling state interest. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455
(1980). Recently the Court indicated that restrictions on speech in a non-public
forum would be subjected only to minimal scrutiny and need not be justified by a
compelling state interest. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473
U.S. 788 (1985).
45. "There is an 'equality of status in the field of ideas,' and government
must afford all points of view an equal opportunity to be heard. Once a forum is
opened up to assembly or speaking by some groups, government may not prohibit
others from assembling or speaking on the basis of what they intend to say." Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1971).
46. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
47. Id. at 511.
48. Concurring in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927). See also
West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette: "If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion or other matters of opinion ....
" 319
U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
49. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 266-67; Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
50. See supra text accompanying note 44.
51. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509.
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tion 2 The constitutional duty of the school administration should
be to maintain order by quieting those who interfere with the
speaker's right to speak, not by compelling the speaker's silence.5 3
Moreover, the mere undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right of freedom of expression." In order to provide sufficient opportunity for the school's
program of instruction to be carried out, as well as to optimize the
opportunity for others who wish to be heard, the timing and manner of expressing oneself at school are subject to reasonable
regulation. 55
Minors constitutionally may be accorded greater protection
from sexually explicit and other offensive speech than is permissible under obscenity standards applicable to adults.5 6 Accordingly,
school authorities are within their rights to rule out indecent and
offensive speech at school."
School boards and teachers are enjoined against engaging in
religious exercises and prescribing religious instruction by the establishment clause of the first amendment.5 8 This injunction forms
another basis to justify limitations placed on communications at
school. 9
52. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 269; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309-10
(1940). See the opposing view of Freeman, supra note 29, at 12, who argues that
the only speech protected in school is that which is ineffective and largely ignored
by others because if it is effective, it naturally interferes with the educational
process and may be banned.
53. See Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949). See also Massie v. Henry,
455 F.2d 779, 783 (4th Cir. 1972) (high school hair length regulations invalidated
- no proof of ineffectiveness in disciplining those who disrupted the longhaired
students). But see Ferrell v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 392 F.2d 697 (5th Cir.
1968) (hair length regulation upheld because presence of longhaired students
might be disruptive).
54. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508.
55. See Grayned, 408 U.S. at 115-16.
56. Federal Communications Comm'n. v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726
(1978); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
57. School officials were held to have properly disciplined a high school student for using sexually suggestive language in a school assembly in Bethel School
Dist. v. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. 3159 (1986). But see Erznoznick v. Jacksonville, 422
U.S. 205, 213-14 (1975) (state may not supress speech solely to protect the young
from ideas or images that a legislative body thinks unsuitable for them).
58. E.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S. Ct. 2573 (1978); School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
59. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 271 (avoiding violation of establishment clause "may
be characterized as compelling"); Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 741
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1983
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Teachers' Freedom of Expression: Academic Freedom

The Supreme Court repeatedly has spoken in the most reverent terms about academic freedom in colleges and universities. In
Keyishian v. Board of Regents,6" the Court struck down a requirement that faculty sign loyalty oaths, expressing the concern that
robust discussion in the classroom would be inhibited. The Court
stated that the first amendment does not tolerate laws that "cast a
pall of orthodoxy over the classroom . . . [which is] 'the marketplace of ideas'. . . . Our nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of transcendant value to all of us
and not merely to the teachers concerned."6' 1 In Sweezy v. New
Hampshire,6 2 the Court set aside the punishment of a professor for
contempt who refused to answer questions regarding a college lecture. Chief Justice Warren, in his opinion for the plurality, stated,
"The essentiality of freedom in the community of American universities is almost self-evident ....
Teachers and students must
always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new
maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die."6
In the above-quoted passages from Keyishian and Sweezy, the
Court was referring to the conception of academic freedom that
embraces the free speech right of teachers in their classrooms. Academic freedom also can be viewed as an institutional right, ultimately possessed by the governing body of the college or university. It was this concept of academic freedom to which Justice
Frankfurter adverted in his concurring opinion in Sweezy when he
identified " 'the four essential freedoms' of a university - to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may
be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to
study. ' 64 Justice Powell also referred to academic freedom as an
institutional prerogative when he described it as "a special concern
of the First Amendment," concurring in University of California
Regents v. Bakke.6 5 On the high school and grade school levels, the
F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 475 U.S. 534 (1986).
60. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
61. Id. at 603. The future of the country depends on people who are trained
to seek the truth through "a multitude of tongues" rather than through "authoritative selection." Id.
62. 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
63. Id. at 250.
64. Id. at 263.
65. 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978).
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institutional aspect of academic freedom would belong to the
school board. Perhaps this is another way of emphasizing the great
value assigned in our constitutional system to the autonomy of local boards of education. 6
Nevertheless, in Keyishian the Supreme Court stated in unmistakable terms that teachers at the college level have the right
to speak freely in the classroom. Commentators are divided as to
whether teacher academic freedom must be respected at the secondary or primary levels.6

7

There are vast differences between col-

lege and high school level courses. The Supreme Court noted in
Tilton v. Richardson" that college teachers, as contrasted with
high school teachers, have "a high degree of academic freedom and
seek to evoke free and critical responses from their students."69
The Supreme Court has spoken clearly in vindication of public
school teachers' first amendment freedom outside the classroom.
Their freedom of association 0 and their right to speak freely
outside of class 71 are now established beyond question.
In Epperson v. Arkansas,2 the Court struck down a statute
which forbade the teaching of evolution in public schools. The majority decided the case on establishment clause grounds but relied
66. See supra text accompanying notes 30-33. There is considerable agreement that academic freedom is difficult to define. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 611-16 (1970); Fellman, Academic Freedom in American Law,
1961 Wis. L. REV. 3, 17; Goldstein, supra note 1; Smalls, A Legal Framework for
Academic Freedom in Public Secondary Schools, 12 J. LAW & EDUC. 529, 541-43
(1983); Developments in the Law - Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1045,
1053 (1968).
67. Those opposing protection of academic freedom in the public schools include: Goldstein, supra note 1, at 1242-43; Smalls, supra note 66, at 538-43, 54143 (argues that academic freedom is central to the educational process but is too
difficult to define to be entitled to protection). Those favoring protection of academic freedom in the public schools include: Nahmod, Controversy in the Classroom: The High School Teacher and Freedom of Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1032 (1971); Van Alstyne, The Constitutional Rights of Teachers and
Professors, 1970 DUKE L.J. 841; Murphy, Academic Freedom - An Emerging
Constitutional Right, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 447 (1963); J. BRYSON, CENSORSHIP OF PUBLIC SCHOOL LIBRARY AND INSTRUCTIONAL MATERIAL § 4.1 at 143-44
(1982).
68. 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
69. Id. at 686 (plurality opinion).
70. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
71. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Mt. Healthy City Bd. of
Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
72. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
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in part on the principle of teacher academic freedom. 3 Justice
Stewart based his concurring opinion entirely on the academic
freedom of teachers to teach or not to teach about evolution as
they saw fit. 74 This prompted a criticism by Justice Black in his
concurring opinion, but he acknowledged that some actions would
violate academic freedom, giving the example of compelling a
teacher to teach as true only one theory of a given doctrine. 75
The warmth with which the general concept of teachers' academic freedom was endorsed in Keyishian, the close similarity
which the reasoning in support of this concept bears to the Court's
reasoning that favors the toleration of free inquiry and critical
analysis in the public schools, 70 and the opinions of the justices in
Epperson, all lead to the conclusion that public school teachers are
vested with academic freedom in the classroom. The lower courts
with near unanimity have determined that public school teachers
have academic freedom, 7 and even those courts which have ruled
against teachers in certain situations usually recognize that there is
a constitutionally protected zone of academic freedom surrounding
the classroom teacher. 8
It has been suggested that any academic freedom a public
school teacher possesses is bargained away in the teacher's individual or union contract specifying employer prerogatives with respect
to the curriculum. 79 This notion is contrary to the principle that an
individual may not be required to relinquish first amendment
rights as a condition to securing public employment" and ought to
be rejected.
73. Id. at 104.
74. Id. at 110.
75. Id. at 111.
76. See supra text accompanying notes 22-29.
77. E.g., Kingsville Indep. School Dist. v. Cooper, 611 F.2d 1109 (5th Cir.
1980); Dean v. Timpson Indep. School Dist., 486 F. Supp. 302 (E.D. Tex. 1979);
Parducci v. Rutland, 316 F. Supp. 352 (M.D. Ala. 1970).
78. E.g., Cary v. Board of Educ., 598 F.2d 535, 543 (10th Cir. 1979) (upholding school board's removal of ten books from total of 1,285 books available for
language arts classes); Brubaker v. Board of Educ., 502 F.2d 973, 984-85 (7th Cir.
1974) (upholding discharge of teacher for distribution of "Woodstock" poem celebrating marijuana use and freedom from discipline to eighth graders).
79. Cary, 598 F.2d 535; Hunter, Curriculum, Pedagogy, and the Constitutional Rights of Teachers in Secondary Schools, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 67
(1983).
80. Hunter, supra note 79; Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234
(1977); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 357-60 (1976) (plurality opinion).
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol10/iss3/1
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C. Students' Rights To Express Themselves and To Receive
Communications
1 the SuIn West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette,"
preme Court laid the groundwork for free expression rights of students within public schools by striking down a compulsory flag salute requirement that Jehovah's Witnesses families found to be
conscientiously objectionable. The majority opinion used a freedom of expression analysis, rather than basing its decision on religious freedom. The individual whose "Constitutional freedoms"
the Court found to be deserving of "scrupulous protection ' 2 was
the individual student.
Later, in Tinker v. Des Moines School District,83 the Supreme
Court made it unambiguously clear that public school students retain rights of free expression while they are in school. They do not
"shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression
at the schoolhouse gate."'" The Court held that a student had the
right to wear a black armband to school in silent protest against
the Vietnam War.
More recently, in Board of Education, Island Trees Union
Free School District v. Pico,"3 the Supreme Court again confirmed
the free expression rights of students in the public schools, deciding that school boards are in violation of the first amendment if
they remove books from the library shelves solely because they dislike the ideas in them. For the first time the Pico plurality secured
constitutional protection for the free flow of information and ideas
to students.8 6
The progression from Barnette to Tinker to Pico is a dramatic
expansion of student expression rights. In Barnette, the student
was freed of compulsion to express himself in a manner that violated his conscience. In Tinker, the student was permitted to ex-

81. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
82. Id. at 637.
83. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
84. Id. at 506.
85. 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
86. The plurality relied on a series of cases recognizing a constitutional right
to receive information in various contexts. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Stanley v. Georgia,
394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-63 (1972); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141
(1943). The Court has made it plain that the recipient's rights are independent of
the rights of the communicator. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
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press himself in the manner of his own choosing. In Pico, the
school authorities were forbidden to remove instruments of expression that the students might wish to use.
From the academic freedom cases,8 7 it is apparent that students, as well as teachers, are constitituonally protected to engage
in wide-ranging, free inquiry and debate. As the plurality opinion
in Sweezy v. New Hampshire8 states, "Teachers and students
must always remain free to inquire, to study, and to evaluate...
'189

Student free speech rights are subject to limitations by the
same compelling state interests as heretofore identified, including
ban of indecency, maintenance of order and discipline, and avoiding the establishment of religion.90
D. Right Not To Participatein Unwanted Communication: The
Religious Clauses and Familial Rights
There is a well-grounded free speech basis for a student's objection to taking part in a ceremony or making a pledge, declaration, or affirmation that is offensive to him. Since West Virginia
9 1 school children have been free
Board of Education v. Barnette,
from forced subscription to doctrines which they conscientiously
oppose. "[N]o official. . . can prescribe what shall be orthodox in
politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion, or force
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein." '
A corollary free speech right, not to have to listen to unwanted
communications while a member of a captive audience, although
seemingly based on sound doctrine,9 3 has never gained recognition
by a majority of the Supreme Court." While freedom of expression
has not developed in this direction, the religious clauses of the first
87. See supra text accompanying notes 60-78.

88. 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
89. Id. at 250 (emphasis added).
90. 319 U.S. 624 (1943); see supra text accompanying notes 51-59.
91. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
92. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642. It may violate Barnette to require a student to
recite or express an opinion which he does not hold. Hirschoff, supra note 3, at
913 n.149.
93. Haiman, Speech v. Privacy: Is There a Right Not to be Spoken To? 67
Nw. U.L. REV. 153 (1972).
94. Public Utility Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 467-69 (1952) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting); id. at 466 (Black, J., separate opinion); Lehman v. City of Shaker
Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 305-08 (1974) (Douglas, J., concurring).
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amendment and the doctrine of familial privacy derived from the
fourteenth amendment have been interpreted in ways that provide
extensive protection to the public school student against unwanted
communications.
1. Establishment of Religion
The framework of the first amendment establishment clause
largely has been developed by cases involving public education.
Thus, among the landmark establishment clause cases are Engel v.
Vitale, 95 disapproving the recitation of a "denominationally neutral" school prayer, and School District of Abington v. Schempp,"
forbidding daily Bible readings in the schools. The Court has made
it clear that "teaching and learning" must not "be tailored to the
principles or prohibitions of any religious sect or dogma.

' 97

The

establishment clause not only prohibits discrimination among religious denominations but also requires that no preference be
granted to those with religious faith over those who profess no religion at all.9" The Supreme Court has rigorously applied the establishment clause to religious activities in the public schools.9 9 The
Court reasons that school children are particularly vulnerable to
religious influences in the schools on account of their relative immaturity and susceptibility, their required presence by virtue of
the compulsory attendance laws, the schools' coercive and authoritarian atmosphere, the influences of teachers as role models, and
the peer pressure applied by conformist fellow students.'00
Currently, establishment clause questions are resolved by the
application of a three-part test announced in Lemon v. Kurtzman,1' 1 a case dealing with the extent to which public financial aid
of religious educational institutions is permitted. For a questioned
95. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
96. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
97. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 106 (1968).
98. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947); School Dist. of Abingdon, 374 U.S. at 216. "Whenever the state itself speaks on a religious subject,
one of the questions that we must ask is 'whether the government intends to convey a message of endorsement or disapproval of religion.'" Wallace v. Jaffree, 472
U.S. 38, 60-61 (1985).
99. See infra note 102.
100. Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S.Ct. 2573 (1987); Grand Rapids School Dist.
v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 383 (1985); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 60 n.51 (1985);
Meek v. Pittinger, 421 U.S. 349, 369 (1975).
101. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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practice or activity to pass muster under the establishment clause,
it must be shown that: the legislative or other governmental entity
adopted the law or practice with a secular purpose; the principal or
primary effect of the statute or practice is one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and the statute or practice does not
result in an excessive entanglement of government with religion.1 02
A violation of any one of the three Lemon tests requires that the
questioned law or practice be prohibited.10 3 The Lemon tests were
devised to provide for a more sensitive analysis of church-state issues than would be possible by literally invoking "[tihe metaphor
of a 'wall' or impassable barrier between Church and State"10 to
provide "room for play in the joints productive of a benevolent
neutrality which will permit religious exercise to exist without
sponsorship and without interference.""1 5 The second, or "primary
effect," Lemon test seemingly has been converted into a requirement that any nonsecular effect be remote, indirect, and incidental
so that many secondary effects can serve to invalidate laws or practices.108 The main concern of the third, or "entanglement," Lemon
test is to avoid an improperly high level of administrative surveillance over religious practices.10 7 Additionally, the purpose of the
"entanglement" test is guarding against political divisions of soci102. Id. at 612-13. The Lemon tests, while occasionally questioned, Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984) (plurality); id. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (creche in public parks if accompanied by plastic Santa Claus and reindeer
not an establishment of religion), and departed from in other contexts, e.g.,
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (state legislative chaplaincy not an establishment of religion), have been relied upon in every Supreme Court decision
dealing with religion in the education of children. Grand Rapids School Dist. v.
Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
103. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 40-41 (1980).
104. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 450 (1971).
105. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970).
106. See Meek v. Pittinger, 421 U.S. 349, 366, 368 (1975) (guidance counselors in religious schools); Committee for Public Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 783
n.39 (1973). See also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-9, at 840
(1978). An alternative explanation for the same result is reliance on the third or
"entanglement" test to invalidate actions that have only secondary effects. Lemon
v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613-14 (salary supplements to teachers in religious
schools who taught wholly secular subjects); Meek, 421 U.S. at 367-72. But see
Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977), allowing the expenditure of public funds
for secular textbooks to be loaned to students in religious schools and for standardized tests and diagnostic and therapeutic services - the primary effect was
held to be to advance education.
107. Walz, 397 U.S. at 674-75.
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol10/iss3/1
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ety along religious lines. 108 Recently, the Supreme Court signaled
that the "entanglement" test is to be applied in a somewhat less
rigorous fashion than in prior cases.10 9 The Court also recently
stated that "no fixed per se rules can be framed" for establishment
clause analysis, and the outcome of each case must depend on "all
the circumstances of a particular relationship."' 10
The extent to which school boards and teachers can accommodate religious preferences and aversions out of regard for free exercise clause values, without violating the establishment clause, is an
issue of great importance in any examination of the first amendment in the public schools. In Zorach v. Clauson,"' the Supreme
Court indicated that the establishment clause is not violated when
the governmental action in question has only the effect of accommodating religious preferences and aversions, not endorsing them.
Thus, in Wisconsin v. Yoder," 2 the Court held that Amish families
should be allowed to withdraw their children from public schooling
beyond the eighth grade in order to protect their religious beliefs
because this accommodation did not in itself violate the establishment clause." 3
A recent Supreme Court decision, Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc.,"' imposes limitations on the validity under the establishment clause of accommodations to religious interests. In Caldor,
the Court struck down a state statute compelling employers to
honor employees' choice of a sabbath by not requiring them to
work on that day. The Court reasoned that this law was an establishment of religion under the second Lemon test since the law had
the primary effect of advancing religious practices over observing a
108. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622-23; Meek 421 U.S. at 372; Committee for Public
Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 797-98 (political divisiveness "a warning signal not
to be ignored").
109. In Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983), the Court upheld tax deductions for public and private school expenses, ruling that it did not violate the
"entanglement" test for state officials to determine which textbooks are for teaching religious tenets, doctrine or worship for inculcative purposes and are therefore
nondeductible. Contrast with Lemon, 403 U.S. at 615-22, and New York v. Cathedral Academy, 434 U.S. 125 (1977).
110. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678-79 (1984).
111. 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952). The Court in Lynch, 465 U.S. at 673, went
much further, stating that the Constitution "affirmatively mandates accommodation, not merely tolerance, of all religions ... "

112. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
113. Id. at 234 n.22.
114. 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
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sabbath. The Court expressed particular concern over the burdens
and inconveniences to employers and fellow employees.
While Caldor appears to represent a retreat from the permissive attitude toward accommodation displayed in earlier cases, it
may have no impact on accommodations of religious interests in
the field of public education. In this area the burdens on other students and faculty are minimal, and, most importantly, the primary
effect is to advance the cause of religious freedom rather than to
advance religious practices.115 Some of the courts of appeals have
concluded that public schools' accommodations of religion by tolerating religious speech will be perceived inaccurately by the students as state sponsorship of religion, which would violate the establishment clause." 6 These conclusions, at least for upper grade
levels, are rendered suspect by a body of research in adolescent
psychology which shows that high school students are independent
and capable of critical inquiry,117 they possess sophisticated and
complex intellectual functions,' they have the ability to reject the
views of others," 9 and they have established new selfidentities and formed personal ideals and values.12 0 Most importantly, psychologists have found that adolescents expect respect
and tolerance from the school authorities and recognize when the
authorities attempt to control their lives.121 This same body of research has negative implications for the Supreme Court's rationale
115. See infra notes 191-212.

116. Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Indep. School Dist., 669 F.2d
1038, 1045-46 (5th Cir. 1982); Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971, 978 (2d
Cir. 1980); Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 741 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1984),
rev'd on other grounds, 475 U.S. 534 (1986). Similarly, Strossen, supra note 1, at
394, suggests that deleting or adding materials to the curriculum to accommodate
the religious objections of some students conveys the message that the school approves of the religious beliefs of the objecting students.
117. Note, The Constitutional Dimensions of Student-Initiated Religious
Activity in Public High Schools, 92 YALE L.J. 499, 507 (1983).
118. Piaget, The Intellectual Development of the Adolescent, ADOLESCENCE
23 (G. Caplan, ed. 1969); Osterrieth, Adolescence: Some Psychological Aspects,
ADOLESCENCE 14-15; Gallagher & Noppe, Cognitive Development and Learning,
UNDERSTANDING ADOLESCENCE 208-16 (J. Adams ed. 1976).
119. Coleman, Friendshipand the Peer Group in Adolescence, HANDBOOK OF
ADOLESCENT PSYCHOLOGY 424-25 (J. Adelson ed. 1980).
120. E. Erikson, IDENTITY: YOUTH AND CRISIS (1968).
121. K. Garrison, PSYCHOLOGY OF ADOLESCENCE 79 (1975). But see older studies indicating contrary to the foregoing that students are impressionable and susceptible, cited in Choper, Religion in the Public Schools: A Proposed Constitutional Standard, 47 MINN. L. REV. 329, 343-44 (1963).
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of coercion and influence that is invoked to support the Court's
rigorous enforcement of the establishment clause in public school
1 22
controversies.
A vital question for examination of establishment clause issues
in public education is what constitutes religion. If the definition of
religion is borrowed from a free exercise clause analysis, a very
broad conception would apply. In United States v. Seeger,'2 3 a free
exercise case, the Supreme Court held that humanistic and nonsectarian moralistic beliefs are religious beliefs for the purpose of construing the conscientious objection exemption to the draft.' 2' Some
jurists and commentators have urged that the definition of religion
25
should be the same for free exercise and establishment purposes.
Other scholars argue that the sweeping definition of religion for
free exercise purposes is inappropriate in an establishment analysis.' 26 The latter commentators appear to have the better argument, for if religion for establishment clause purposes meant something broader than the classical conception of religion, a host of
the government's social and humanitarian programs would be subject to prohibition. Thus, in several decisions, the Supreme Court
assumes that the teaching of morality and a variety of commonly
held social values in the public schools is not only a permissible
secular activity but also a highly
appropriate, if not essential, part
1 27
of the education of youth.
On the other hand, it is conceivable that the state could invest
2 8
a secular philosophy with so much of the trappings of a religion
122. See supra text accompanying notes 99-100.

123. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
124. Id. at 187.
125. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 32 (Rutledge, J., dissenting);
Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 211-13 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, J., concurring);
Strossen, supra note 1, at 372.
126. Freund, Public Aid to ParochialSchools, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1680, 1686-87
n.14 (1969); Galanter, Religious Freedom in the United States: A Turning Point?
1966 Wis. L. REV. 217, 266; L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 827-28
(1978); Note, Toward a Constitutional Definition of Religion, 91 HARV. L. REV.
1056, 1085-86 (1978).
127. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954); Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982); Ambach
of Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979); West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624 (1943); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961) ("[Tihe 'Establishment Clause' does not ban federal or state regulation of conduct whose reason or
effect merely happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or all
religions").
128. Systems of beliefs are labeled religious when they (1) address ultimate
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that the establishment clause would be violated. In School District
of Abington v. Schempp,'29 the Supreme Court said, "[T]he State
may not establish a 'religion of secularism' in the sense of affirmatively opposing or showing hostility to religion, thus 'preferring
those who belive in no religion over those who do believe.'

"130

In

Torasco v. Watkins,' a free exercise case, the Court said, "Among
religions in this country which do not teach what would generally
be considered a belief in the existence of God are

. .

. Ethical Cul-

ture, Secular Humanism, and others."' 3' Many conservative religionists, after examining modern school texts and other teaching
materials, became convinced that current public education had
adopted a secular humanist creed in violation of the establishment
clause. 3 ' Humanistic education programs commonly used in public
school systems focus primarily on methodology: teachers confront
pupils with a question, experience, or moral dilemma and ask them
to state a value judgment or feeling; then a dialogue follows in
which the consequences and intellectual sufficiency of the responses are weighed.134 Humanistic education teaches that there
are few inherently right and wrong values' 35 and that man is inconcerns, (2) espouse a comprehensive life view, (3) possess external indicia such
as ritual and symbols and organizational structure. Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197,
207-10 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, J., concurring).
129. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
130. Id. at 225.
131. 367 U.S. 488 (1961).'
132. Id. at 495 n.11. Humanism is regularly accepted as a religion for free
exercise purposes. Washington Ethical Soc'y v. District of Columbia, 249 F.2d
127, 129 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Fellowship of Humanity v. Alameda Co., 153 Cal. App.
2d 673, 315 P.2d 394 (1957).
133. E.g., Hill, Parents Sleep While Humanism Destroys Souls of Youth,
VOICE OF FREEDOM 87 (June 1980); McMaster, Our Public Schools, CHRISTIAN
LIFE MAGAZINE 32 (June 1980) ("Humanism is such a pleasant-sounding word
that it disarms most people. But unless this trend in education is rooted out of
our public schools, the future of the nation is imperiled.").
134. SIMON, A HANDBOOK OF PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR TEACHERS AND STUDENTS (1972); SIMPSON, HUMANISTIC EDUCATION: AN INTERPRETATION 77-91 (1976).
Some examples of questions from SIMON, supra, at 10, 41, 43, 50-53, 140 include:
"How many of you would encourage legal abortion for an unwed daughter . . .
read Playboy magazine ... would be upset if organized religion disappeared...
think that parents should teach their children to masturbate ... would choose to
die and go to heaven if it meant playing a harp all day long?"
135. SIMON, supra note 134, at 15-17; Harmon, Values, in ALLEN, THE
TEACHER'S HANDBOOK 294 (1971).
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nately good. 136 Most humanistic education programs reject the idea
that human purposes and goals can be determined by God or any
other external standard. 18 7 Humanistic education evolved into a
comprehensive social and moral philosophy, 138 which coincides
with the nontheistic philosophical movement of secular humanism."3 9 In contrast, several major religious faiths teach that: man is
primarily a spiritual being; values are determined from external
standards; there are right and wrong values which are transcendental and absolute rather than situational and relative; and man is by
nature sinful.1 40 Depending on the applicable definition of religion,
humanist education programs likely can be presented in such a
way as to constitute an establishment of religion. The implications
of humanist education, however, are even more serious when examined in light of the free exercise clause.
2. Free Exercise of Religion
School children and their families have the right to hold and
exercise their religious beliefs free of interference by the state.
Whether or not there is a constitutional entitlement to a public
education,"" it is a state-provided benefit of enormous value and
importance and, indeed, either it or a substituted private educa136. SIMPSON, supra note 134, at 4.
137. Id. at 3.
138. Id. at 67; Newman, Social Action and Humanistic Education,HUMANISTIC EDUCATION 67 (R. Weller ed. 1977).
139. Brubaker & Zahorik, Toward More Humanistic Instruction (1972)
(making the connection between humanistic education and the philosophic movement explicit); A Humanist Manifesto, 6 NEw HUMANIST (1933); Humanist Manifesto 11, 33 HUMANIST 4 (1973) (God, religion and supernatural are irrelevant; specific religious beliefs including heaven or hell, life after death, separate human
soul, creation of man by direct act of God are dangerous; moral values are wholly
relative and situational; meaning is a function of present happiness; no form of
sexual conduct short of unbridled promiscuity is evil; faith in God who hears and
answers prayers is assumed to love humankind and is an unproved and outmoded
faith); A SECULAR HUMANIST DECLARATION 7-29 (P. Kurtz ed. 1980).
140. E.g., Southern Baptist Convention, Baptist Faith and Message (1963)
(man sinful by nature; Bible is supreme standard). Much of the discussion in the
text infra notes 133-39 and the material in these notes was taken from Note, The
Establishment Clause, Secondary Religions Effects and Humanistic Education,
91 YALE L.J. 1196, 1208-09 nn.64-68 (1982).

141. See supra text accompanying notes 9-12. It is clear that public education is treated as a constitutional entitlement under many state constitutions.
E.g., N.C. CONST. art. I, § 15; id. at art. IX, § 2(1).
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tion is compulsory. 142 In Sherbert v. Verner'" and Thomas v. Review Board,""the Supreme Court held that one cannot be forced
to forsake or alter religious beliefs in order to secure a state benefit, unless the state has a compelling interest to overcome the religious right and pursues this interest by the least restrictive
means.14 5 In Thomas, which held that state unemployment benefits cannot be denied to a worker who refuses to work on his sabbath for religious reasons, the Court said, "Where the state conditions receipt of an important benefit upon conduct proscribed by a
religious faith, or where it denies such a benefit because of conduct
mandated by a religious belief, . . . a burden upon religion exists." I " While Thomas was reaffirmed as recently as 1987," the
1986 case of Bowen v. Roy 148 raises a question as to limits that may
be imposed on the Sherbert-Thomas doctrine. In Bowen, the Court
rejected the free exercise claims of parents who had refused to apply for a social security number for their infant daughter on religious grounds and accordingly were denied food stamps and welfare benefits for her. Chief Justice Burger wrote for an eightmember majority of the Court"'; only Justice White dissented,
feeling that Sherbert and Thomas were controlling.' 5"
The Supreme Court decision of Wisconsin v. Yoder"' is the
leading authority on the conflict between public school requirements and student families' freedom of religion. Amish parents be142. Project, supra note 2, at 1383 n.43 (48 states have compulsory attendance laws).
143. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
144. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
145. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707; Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. at
406-07; United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 258 (1982) ("overriding" interest).
146. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 717-18. Religious speech, as well as religious worship and prayer, are protected communications under the free speech clause of
the first amendment. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 640 (1978) (Brennan, J.,
concurring); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269 (1981). The free speech principles discussed supra in Part III, A of this Article provide an alternative source of
protection for the religious free exercise claims discussed in this part of the
article.
147. Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 107 S.Ct. 1046 (1987).
148. 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
149. "Never to our knowledge has the Court interpreted the First Amendment to require the Government itself to behave in ways that the individual believes will further his or her spiritual development or that of his or her family."
Id. at 696 (emphasis in the original).
150. Id. at 699.
151. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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lieved that sending their children to high school would endanger
the children's religious salvation. The Amish hold as a central belief that salvation requires life in a church community separate
from worldly influence. The Court upheld the right of the Amish to
discontinue formal education after the eighth grade, concluding
that one or two years of additional education are not necessary to
prepare Amish children for life in a segregated, agrarian community. The Court invoked the principles that only state interests of
the highest order can overcome freedom of religion claims and that
the state must employ only the least restrictive means.15 2 The
Court decided that the state's asserted interests of need to prepare
children for effective participation in the political system and selfsufficiency in society were not compelling enough to overcome the
religious rights of the Amish families.
Not every asserted religious claim against public school programs will be entitled to protection under Yoder. Several requirements must be met in order for a religious claim to prevail. First,
the belief must be sincerely held. Some claims are "so bizarre, so
clearly nonreligious in motivation" that they should be denied
credence under the free exercise clause. 15 3 Second, the belief must
be essential to the religious doctrinal basis, and the activity in
question must create a substantial burden for the claimant.15 Peripheral, tangential, or trivial claims will not be upheld. Religious
claimants are entitled to protection only from those matters that
are truly abhorrent and irreconcilable with their beliefs and not
merely from those which are distasteful or unpleasant.1 55 Third,
the religious claim must yield to a compelling state interest if ad152. Id. at 215.
153. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 715. Although the truth of a belief "is not open to
question, there remains the significant question whether it is 'truly held.'" United
States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965).
154. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403; Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 218 ("very
real threat" to "basic religious tenets and practices"); Fiedler v. Marmusco Christian School, 631 F.2d 1144, 1151 (4th Cir. 1980); Brown v. Dade Christian Schools,
Inc., 556 F.2d 310, 313-14 (5th Cir. 1977). See Clark, Guidelines for the Free Exercise Clause, 83 HARV. L. REV. 327, 329-44 (1969); Gianella, Religious Liberty
Guarantee,80 HARV. L. REV. 1381, 1390 (1967).
155. "[T]he state has no legitimate interest in protecting any or all religions
from views distasteful to them .

. . ."

Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S.

495, 505 (1952). Accord Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 319-20 (1980); McGowan
v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 102
(1967).
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vanced by the least restrictive means. 56 Compelling state interests
include such basic governmental responsibilities as maintenance of
public safety, order, peace, and health. Thus, in Prince v.Massachusetts,' 57 the Supreme Court upheld a law that prohibited young

children from publicly soliciting contributions against the religious
claims of a Jehovah's Witnesses' family.158 Were it not for these
limitations, entirely too much of the useful, even vital, process of
government could be paralyzed by demands of conscientious objectors. As Justice Jackson stated, "If we are to eliminate everything
that is objectionable to any of [the religious bodies existing in the
United States] or inconsistent with any of their doctrines, we will
leave public education in shreds."' 59
The Yoder Court indicated that free exercise claims in the
context of public schooling would be limited to those of traditional
religious denominations' 60 and would not encompass philosophical
and personal beliefs that had been equated with religious claims
for the purpose of the draft law conscientious objector exemption
in United States v. Seeger.' 6' This limitation would in no way diminish the strength of claims by members of the religious right
that they are being deprived of the free exercise of religion in humanistic educational programs' 62 since generally they belong to organized, recognized, traditional religious sects; they object, not
subscribe, to a secular substitute for religion. The Yoder opinion
suggests a further limitation of the decision to apply to groups like
the Amish with long histories of living in isolated, unified communities.' 63 The limitation may well have been intended as to the
drastic remedy of eliminating altogether a part of the compulsory
education requirement rather than as a limitation to the general
156. Thomas, 450 U.S. 707; Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406-07; United States v.
Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 258 (1982) ("overriding" interest).
157. 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944).
158. See also Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (upholding Medicaid
funding of abortion); United States v. Reynolds, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (upholding
law against polygamy).

159. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 235 (1948) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
160. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215-16.
161. 380 U.S. 163 (1965). It has been suggested that the Seeger analysis is
not appropriate in contexts other than exemption from conscription. Note, Toward a ConstitutionalDefinition of Religion, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1056, 1063 (1978).
162. See infra discussion at notes 166-67.
163. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 236. See Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827
F.2d 1058, 1067 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 1029 (1988).

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol10/iss3/1

26

Smith: Constitutional Rights of Students, Their Families, and Teachers i

1988]

FIRST AMENDMENT IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS

principle that conscientious religious objections to certain aspects
of school programs ought to be honored if it reasonably can be
done. The Court also noted in Yoder that high schools "tend to
emphasize intellectual and scientific accomplishments, self-distinction, competitiveness, worldly success, and social life with other
students,""' values inconsistent with the central beliefs of the
Amish. The same values are inconsistent with the tenets of several
fundamentalist Protestant sects, whose 65
adherents are as fully deserving of protection as are the Amish.'
Some aspects of humanistic education programs, as well as the
teaching of evolution and certain other subjects, substantially burden the belief systems of many fundamentalist Christians. Children may be taught in school that man is by nature good, while
their religion teaches that man is sinful; they may be taught in
school that most values are relative and independent of external
referents, while their religion teaches that values are derived from
the external Biblical standard. 66 If these educational programs
succeed, students will be likely to reject certain of their religious
beliefs.'6 7 Yoder and the Sherbert-Thomas line of cases lead to the
conclusion that students and their families whose religious beliefs
are subject to impairment in the public schools are entitled by the
free exercise clause to some form of relief.
3.

Familial ChildrearingRights

6
In Meyer v. Nebraska,'
the Supreme Court struck down a
state law forbidding the teaching of modern foreign language in

164. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 211.
165. Consider, for example, the clear religious conflicts that Apostolic
Lutherans have within the public schools; they are forbidden to study evolution
or "humanistic" philosophy, or to listen to the radio or watch television. Comment, Teaching the Theories of Evolution and Scientific Creationism in the
Public Schools: The First Amendment Religion Clauses and Permissible Relief,
15 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 421, 445 n.109 (1982).
166. See supra notes 134-40 and accompanying text.
167. See Bird, Freedom of Religion and Science Instruction in Public
Schools, 87 YALE L.J. 515, 537 n.107 (1978); Rice, Conscientious Objection to
Public Education: The Grievanceand the Remedies, 1978 B.Y.U.L. REv. 847.
168. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). The Court referred to the Spartan system of assembling males at age seven into barracks and entrusting their education and training
to official guardians. Such ideas "touching the relationship between individuals
and State were wholly different from those upon which our institutions rest
Id. at 402.
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public and private schools. The Court found that the statute violated parental interests in their children's upbringing, the parental
rights to "establish a home and bring up children. 1' 69 In Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 70 the Supreme Court invalidated a law that required all children to attend public schools. On the authority of
Pierce, parents have an absolute constitutional right to withdraw
their children from public schools and enroll them in private or
parochial schools. The Court based its opinion in part on the parental right to "direct the upbringing and education of children
under their control,"'' stating that this liberty "excludes any genThe child
eral power of the state to standardize its children ....
"1172
....
State
of
the
mere
creature
is not the
Meyer and Pierce have been variously explained173 and rationalized.174 However, they have retained their vitality. The Court in
Wisconsin v. Yoder referred to Pierce "as a charter of the rights of
parents to direct the religious upbringing of their children."'1 75 The
Meyer-Pierce doctrine contributes to the structural needs of the
political system, making it impossible for the state to withdraw
completely the parents' right to inculcate their children, thereby
preventing the state from creating an indoctrinative monopoly.' 76
169. Id. at 399.

170. 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925).
171. Id. at 534-35.
172. Id.
173. These cases are sometimes viewed as judicial reactions to the strong
post-World War I political pressures on the states to use their schools to create an
ideologically homogenous population, purged of "foreign" ideas. Moskowitz, The
Making of the Moral Child: Legal Implications of Value Education, 6 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 105, 110-11 (1987); Tyack, The Perils of Pluralism: The Background of the Pierce Case, 77 AM. HIST. REV. 74 (1968).
174. Meyer depended in part on the substantive due process right of language teachers to engage in their occupations, 262 U.S. at 400, and Pierce in part
was based on the substantive due process rights of private schools to conduct
their businesses, 268 U.S. at 536, which are now of questionable validity. These
cases are sometimes discussed in terms of first amendment values - limitations
on the indoctrinating power of the state. Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393
U.S. 503, 506-07 (1969); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15-6 (1970);

Arons & Lawrence, The Manipulation of Consciousness: A First Amendment
Critique of Schooling, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 309, 318 n.28 (1980).
175. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972).
176. Heymann & Barzelay, The Forest and the Trees: Roe v. Wade and its
Critics, 53 B.U.L. REV. 765, 772-73 (1973); Note, State Indoctrinationand the
Protection of Non-State Voices in the Schools: Justifying a Prohibition of
School Library Censorship, 35 STAN. L. REV. 497, 532-33 (1982).
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MEASURES FOR PROTECTING CHILDREN'S, FAMILIES', AND
TEACHERS' CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

A variety of measures can be employed to eliminate or mitigate the aspects of public educational programs that are antithetical to interests with which the first amendment is concerned. Some
of these measures can be claimed as a matter of constitutional entitlement. Others, while not constitutionally mandated, can be invoked by school administrations as sound public policy.
A.

Exemptions from Public School or Any School

Pierce v. Society of Sisters17 7 established beyond question the
rights of parents to withdraw their children from public school and
place them in private or parochial school. This right is absolute.
While the parents may be motivated by religious or doctrinal reasons, they are not hindered by any burden of proof of reason or
cause. This simple outlet for dissatisfaction with public schooling
relieves tensions and resolves dilemmas that otherwise would be
overwhelming. Each religious and ideological splinter group is free
to form its own educational institutions.
The option of removal is seriously flawed in one respect: it is
expensive. The parent, with a large share of his or her tax dollar
spent for public education, must find the additional financial resources to maintain his or her child in a separate privately financed system. There are constitutional constraints against public
financial assistance since most government grants to church-related private schools violate the establishment clause 178 although
9
17
tuition tax deductions do not.

Home education is a refuge for the family who has conscientious objections against various educational programs, public or
private. Home education is far less expensive than private education, provided the parents have sufficient time to be teachers.
While there is no constitutional right to home education,180 a grow177. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
178. E.g., Meek v. Pittinger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602 (1971). Providing such assistance only to nonchurch-related schools
would likely be either politically unworkable or violative of the equal protection
clause.
179. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
180. Scoma v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 391 F. Supp. 452 (N.D. Ill. 1974); State
v. Shaver, 294 N.W.2d 883 (N.D. 1980). Cf. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236,
245-46 (1968) (dictum).
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ing number of states authorize it by statute.1 8
The ultimate protection from perceived undesirable influences
of education is the right to terminate schooling altogether, as was
granted the Amish at the end of the eighth grade in Wisconsin v.
Yoder.182 However, for reasons heretofore indicated, few other
groups could make a sufficient showing to be entitled to the same
exemption. 8 '
It is in the interest of those families who have chosen alternative educational arrangements not to have the states impose requirements and prohibitions similar to those that inspired them to
abandon public education. The Supreme Court in Farrington v.
Tokushige18 1 held unconstitutional, as violative of the parents'
right to control the child's education, a statute that regulated the
use of textbooks, teacher qualifications, curriculum, language used,
and entrance and attendance requirements in private schools.
Forty-four of the states no longer impose teacher certification,
courses of instruction, or other content requirements on nonpublic
schools.18 5 The few states that do have such requirements include
specifications like sex education courses, which some religious dissenters would find highly offensive.8' Generally, the teacher certification requirements have been upheld on the theory that the
state has a compelling interest in competent, qualified teachers,8 7
and the other more intrusive requirements have not been judicially
tested recently, 88 although they would seem to fall afoul of Far181. As of 1986, only nine states did not authorize home education. Note,

The Constitutionalityof Home Education Statutes, 55 UMKC L. REV. 69, 75-76
(1986).

182. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
183. See supra text accompanying note 163.
184. 273 U.S. 284 (1927).
185. Sheridan Road Baptist Church v. Department of Educ., 426 Mich. 462,

396 N.W.2d 373, 419 (1986). A minority of states require certification of home
education instructors. Note, supra note 181, at 76 n.65.
186. See MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 388.382, § 380.1169-70, § 380.1173, § 380.150102, § 380.1516. (E.g., cultures of ethnic, religious, and racial minorities, contributions of women).

187. Nebraska v. Faith Baptist Church, 207 Neb. 802, 301 N.W.2d 571
(1981); State v. Rivinius, 328 N.W.2d 220 (N.D. 1982), Sheridan Road Baptist
Church v. Department of Educ., 426 Mich. 462, 396 N.W.2d 373 (1986) (equally
divided court). Contra People v. Turner, 263 P.2d 685 (Cal. 1953), appeal dismissed, 347 U.S. 972 (1954) (home education law); Kentucky State Bd. of Educ. v.
Rudasill, 589 S.W.2d 817 (Ky. 1979).
188. See Baker, Regulation of FundamentalistChristianSchools: Free Exer-

cise of Religion v. The State Interest in Quality Education, 67 Ky. L.J. 415
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol10/iss3/1
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rington. The Supreme Court has held that private schools are subject to laws against race discrimination in admitting students8 9
but at the same time made it clear that the law did not "inhibit in
any way the teaching in these schools of any idea or dogma," including the desirability of racial discrimination. 9 0
B. Excuses and Substitutions
Students can be excused from courses, blocks of instruction,
and lectures to which they object on freedom of religion or freedom
of expression grounds. Alternative reading or study assignments
ordinarily can be arranged readily. In light of the relatively few
requests and the relative commonality of them (e.g., evolution and
sex education), it should not create an undue administrative burden to provide accommodation to first amendment values in this
way. 9' If the school were not in a position to provide alternative
studies, the dissenting students should be required to avail themselves of relevant nonpublic or home instruction opportunities, if
the state properly regarded the particular subject or area of study
as an essential part of its educational program. It is argued quite
convincingly that the applicable governmental interests' 92 are not
sufficiently strong to compel some form of education in anything
but reading, writing, arithmetic, and basic principles of government. 9 3 If this view is correct, an unconditional excuse would be
justifiable for most types of instruction that were found objectionable on ideological grounds. Teachers who are conscientiously opposed to giving certain types of instruction also could be accommodated easily, by exchanging assignments with other nonobjecting
teachers.'" None of the above accommodations would create an
(1979). Some states expressly forbid government interference in church-related
schools' selection of faculty, curriculum, and textbooks. E.g., TENN. CODE ANN. §
49-50-801(b) (Supp. 1987). However, Kentucky State Bd. of Educ. v. Rudasill, 589
S.W.2d 817 (Ky. 1979), struck down text and curriculum regulations for these
schools.
189. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (private, nonchurch-related
school). Accord Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (private,
church-sponsored school; elimination of tax exempt status).
190. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 176.
191. Cf. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
192. See supra text accompanying notes 3-8 and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205 (1972).
193. Hirschoff, supra note 3, at 918-19, 926-34.
194. Hunter, supra note 79, at 70.
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imposition on the nonobjecting students, since no cognizable injury
is sustained by being required to obtain more education than
95
somebody else.
In light of the foregoing analysis, the granting of excuses
should be a preferred, and in many instances, a required, accommodation of conscientious objectors in school. The Supreme Court
has not provided any direct guidance on this point but has indicated generally that claims for excuses must be weighed cautiously:
"[C]ourts must move with great circumspection in performing the
sensitive and delicate task of weighing a State's legitimate social
concern when faced with religious claims for exception from generally applicable educational requirements.' '19 A number of common
law cases allowed families to require that their children be excused
from courses of instruction to which they were opposed, 9 7 even after the adoption of compulsory school laws," 8 but there were other
cases to the contrary. 9' Among the more recent cases, which have
used a constitutional analysis, the results have been mixed. Some
cases dealing with sex education have ruled that excuses must be
granted, 0 0 and others have upheld sex education programs in part
by reason that provision is made for excuses.2 0 ' However, others
have rejected attacks on sex education courses without regard to
the availability of excuses.20 2 Two courts sustained conscientious
objections to scant clothing in physical education courses, and the
students were excused from wearing the uniform attire.2 0 3 Excuses
195. Most accommodations of conscientious objectors do not discriminate
against others. Galanter, supra note 126, at 291. Cf. Estate of Thornton v. Caldor,
Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985), where on establishment grounds the Supreme Court
invalidated a requirement of honoring every employee's designated sabbath, in
part because it burdened employers and fellow employees. See supra text accompanying note 114.
196. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 235.
197. See supra cases in Hirschoff, note 3, at 886 n.44.
198. Kelley v. Ferguson, 95 Neb. 63, 144 N.W. 1039 (1914); School Bd. Dist.
No. 18 v. Thompson, 24 Okl. 1, 103 P. 579 (1909).
199. See supra cases in Project, supra note 2, at 1433 n.338.
200. Citizens v. San Mateo County Bd. of Educ., 51 Cal. App.3d 1, 124 Cal.
Rptr. 68 (1975), appeal dismissed, 425 U.S. 908 (1976).
201. Medeiros v. Kiyosaki, 52 Haw. 436, 478 P.2d 314 (1970).
202. Cornwell v. State Bd. of Educ., 314 F. Supp. 340 (D. Md. 1969), aff'd,
428 F.2d 471 (4th Cir. 1970) (per curiam); Hopkins v. Hamden Bd. of Educ., 29
Conn. Supp. 397, 289 A.2d 914 (1971), aff'd, 165 Conn. 793, 305 A.2d 536 (1973).
203. Mitchell v. McCall, 143 So. 2d 629 (Ala. 1962); Moody v. Cronin, 484 F.
Supp. 270 (C.D. Ill. 1979).
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from mandatory ROTC 0 4 and dancing2 0 5 classes have been allowed. Apostolic Lutherans who object to audiovisuals were excused from movies and videotape entertainment but not instruction in that form.2 0 One court correctly held that there was no
violation of a student's rights when the student's conscientious objections to an assigned book were accommodated by substituting
20 7
another book for it.
A major attack on the Holt series of basic reading books was
mounted by fundamentalist Christian families of public school
children in Mozert v. Hawkins County Public Schools. 208 They
maintained that the texts emphasized themes that were "feminist,
... humanist, . . . pacifist, . . . anti-Christ, . . . vegetarian, or
[advocating] one-world government," which were "repulsive to
their Christian faith ....,209 The district court found that the
families' free exercise rights were violated, reasoning that, while
there was a compelling state interest to provide education, the
state was pursuing it by unnecessarily broad means to require that
the objectors use the books in question. The court ordered that the
students be excused from the objectionable texts and be allowed to
substitute home reading instruction in accordance with state
law. 2 10 The Sixth Circuit recently reversed, ordering the case
dismissed.2 11
The appeals court's primary rationale was that freedom of religion was not violated because the children were not required to
affirm their belief in any of the ideas mentioned in the challenged
material.21 2 The district court decision seems to have been better
reasoned and more faithful to Supreme Court precedent than was
the appellate decision. The Sherbert-Thomas line of cases does not
require that one be compelled to adopt an antithetical belief to
suffer violation of his religious freedom. It is sufficient proof of a
constitutional claim under these cases that one's religious beliefs
204. Spence v. Bailey, 465 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1972).
205. Hardwick v. Board of School Trustees, 54 Cal. App. 696, 205 P. 49
(1921).
206. Davis v. Page, 385 F. Supp. 395, 401 (D.N.H. 1974).
207. Grove v. Mead School Dist. No. 354, 753 F.2d 1528 (9th Cir. 1985).
208. 765 F.2d 75 (6th Cir. 1985), on remand 647 F. Supp. 1194 (E.D. Tenn.
1986), rev'd, 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987).
209. Mozert, 647 F. Supp. at 1199.
210. Id. at 1201.
211. Mozert, 827 F.2d 1058, 1070.
212. Id. at 1063-66.
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are insulted as the price of accepting a public benefit.2 13
On one narrow aspect of the excuse issue, there is a clear con14
stitutional rule. West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette
excuses students from making expressions of belief, affirmances,
and pledges as to symbols, ideas, values, and principles to which
they are conscientiously opposed.
The constitutional issues raised by claims for excuses are far
easier to resolve than the issues raised by demands to require additions to and deletions from the school program which are discussed
in the following sections. Excuses involve only conflict between the
state's interest in public education and individual constitutional
rights and do not implicate competing constitutional claims,
whereas efforts to alter school programs often bring to bear the
inconsistent constitutional demands of free expression and the religious clauses, as well as the ever-present clash with the school administration's values.
C.

Removals and Additions

Controversies over removals and additions of school materials
and activities can arise in different ways. In some instances, conscientious objectors seek the removal of offensive materials. In other
instances, teachers and students who want to use certain materials
protest school administrators' decisions to remove them. Similar
disputes arise over whether certain materials must be incorporated
into the school program. The interests and values at stake as well
as weighty practical considerations differ with respect both to the
type of first amendment interest (free expression, free exercise of
religion, establishment of religion) that is asserted and whether the
materials or activities in question are library books; curricula or
courses; lectures, questions, or assignments; or extracurricular
activities.
1.

Library Books

In Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free School District v. Pico,2 15 the Supreme Court in a five-to-four decision held
that summary judgment was improperly granted against student
families' claims that the school board had violated their first
213. See supra text accompanying notes 143-46.
214. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
215. 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
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amendment rights by removing school library books for ideological
reasons.21 6 The plurality, consisting of Justices Brennan, Marshall,
Stevens, and Blackmun (who concurred separately) adopted the
affirmative constitutional principle that school authorities may not
remove school library books because they dislike the ideas in
them.2 1 The plurality opinion relied heavily on the first amendment right of students to receive communication.2 1 Justices Rehnquist, Powell, and Burger dissented but nevertheless acknowledged
that there were some circumstances in which a constitutional injury would be imposed by removal of library books, such as where
a Republican board discarded all books favorable to Democrats.2 19
Only Justice O'Connor in her dissenting opinion embraced the absolutist position that school authorities have unfettered discretion
216. Justice White concurred only on the ground that summary judgment
had been improvidently granted. 457 U.S. at 883-84. One court expressed the
opinion that the narrowness of the White concurrence deprived Pico of all precedential value on the constitutional issue presented. Muir v. Alabama Educ. Television Comm'n., 688 F.2d 1033, 1045 n.30 (5th Cir. 1982). This view appears to be
erroneous since Justice White's concurrence necessarily stands for the proposition
that some kind of constitutional violation may occur when books are weeded out
of a library. Freeman, supra note 29, at 38.
217. Pico, 457 U.S. at 871, 879 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Local citizens had
attended a conservative political conference and received a list of books thought
to be improper for students. Nine of the books were found in the high school
library including Kurt Vonnegut's Slaughter House Five (Vonnegut has probably
done more to advance the field of constitutional law, as we shall see in the following sections, than he has done to enrich American literature), Best Short Stories
of Negro Writers, edited by Langston Hughes, and Soul on Ice by Eldridge
Cleaver. The school board disregarded existing procedures for reviewing questioned books. The board appointed a special book review committee which recommended removal of two books, retention of six books (one to be circulated only
with parental approval), and either disregarded or took no positions on the others.
The board rejected the committee's decision, ordering that all the books be removed except two (one subject to parental approval). The removals included the
works listed above.
218. Id. at 866-68. The plurality cited a number of cases upholding the right
to receive written and verbal expression, including Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S.
557, 564 (1969); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-63 (1972); Lamont v.
Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965); and Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141
(1943). The plurality quoted Madison's statement that "[a] popular Government,
without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a
Farce or a tragedy; or, perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance;
[a]nd a people who mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves with
the power which knowledge gives." 9 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 103 (G. Hunt
ed. 1910).
219. Pico, 457 U.S. at 907 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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over the contents of school libraries.220
The Pico plurality readily acknowledged that the schools have
a legitimate interest in inculcating respect for authority and traditional social, moral, and political values.221 The plaintiffs had conceded, and the plurality agreed, that library books could be removed for "pervasive vulgarity" or "educational unsuitability."2'22
The plurality also indicated books that were "psychologically inappropriate" or promoted ideas "manifestly inimical to public welfare" could be eliminated.223 On the other hand, the plurality expressed the view that the state could not throw out books on
grounds of patriotism, fear of potential disturbance, or desire to
suppress unpopular, controversial, or minority views.22' The weight
225
of lower court authority supported the plurality's position. Commentators predicted that, because the Court had not agreed on
standards, a great deal of litigation would be spawned.22 6 Contrary
to these predictions, the Pico decision must have created a broad
consensus in the school community, because not a single published
case in which library book removals was challenged appeared from
the time of Pico's filing in 1982 to the time this article went to
press.
The Pico plurality specified that the decision was not intended
to affect book selection decisions. 227 Both the dissenters 22 and several commentators were critical of what they regarded as an unprincipled distinction between book selection and removal, 229 and
from the latter came suggestions of complicated plans whereby
balanced literary offerings could be judicially mandated.2 30 There
220. Id. at 921.

221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

Id. at 864.
Id. at 871.
Id. at 880.
Id. at 869-71, 874-75, 880 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
See Annotation, Propriety, Under the First Amendment, of School

Board's Censorship of Public School Libraries or Coursebooks, 64 A.L.R. FED. 771
(1983).

226. Comment, Board of Education v. Pico: The Supreme Court's Answer to
School Library Censorship, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 1103 (1983); Note, The First Amendment in the Classroom:Library Book Removals and the Right of Access to Information, 23 B.C.L. REV. 1471, 1527 (1982).
227. Pico, 457 U.S. at 869.

228. Id. at 887 (Burger, C.J.); id. at 910 (Rehnquist, J.).
229. E.g., Note, 19 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 119, 134-35 (1983).
230. Note, First Amendment Limitations on the Power of School Boards to
Select and Remove High School Texts and Library Books, 52 ST. JOHN's L. REV.
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seem to be only two reported decisions dealing with schools' refusals to acquire specified library materials, both of which favor the
school authorities.2 31 There is a principled distinction of considerable importance between reversing removals and requiring acquisitions: in the former case, the court is typically overriding the
school board and confirming the school librarian's academic freedom; while in the latter case, the court is called upon to interfere
with the librarian's academic freedom. 2 2 There are also sharp
practical distinctions between removals and acquisitions of library
books. Removal invariably has been accomplished in a censorial
way, in the most abhorrent tradition of bookburning. 23 Acquisition, on the other hand, is the product of the librarian's trained,
skilled work, with access to various comprehensive lists of recommended books and often with the aid of balanced advisory committees.2

4

Another practical distinction is that book removals en-

tail the waste of public funds, whereas acquisitions represent
enduring investments. Finally, the judicial role is far more complex
with a much less predictable outcome when the court faces the
task of ensuring that the school library has a balanced array of
publications than when it must decide only whether a book removal was unconstitutionally motivated.2 5
2.

Textbooks, Courses, and Curricula

When the Board of Education of Kanawha County, West Virginia, voted in 1974 to purchase certain textbooks despite citizens'
petitions urging rejection, "homes were firebombed, schools were
457, 474-83 (1978).
231. Bicknell v. Vergennes Union High School Bd. of Directors, 638 F.2d 438,
442 (2d Cir. 1980), holds that the school board could alter a librarian's right to
purchase new books. Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577 (6th

Cir. 1976) upholds the school board's refusal to purchase Vonnegut's God Bless
You, Mr. Rosewater and Joseph Heller's Catch-22 for the library, while at the
same time holding against the school board's right to remove Vonnegut's Cat's
Cradle and Heller's Catch-22 from the library.
232. Note, What are the Limits to a School Board's Authority to Remove
Books from School Library Shelves?, 1982 Wis. L. R.v. 417, 431.
233. There actually was a public bookburning of books removed from the
school library in Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300 (7th
Cir. 1980).
234. Dunn, Pico and Beyond: School Library Censorship Controversies, 77
LAW LIB. J. 435, 455-56 (1984).

235. See van Geel, The Search for ConstitutionalLimits on Governmental
Authority to Inculcate Youth, 62 TEx. L. REv. 197, 218-20 (1983).
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dynamited, gunfire was exchanged .
."I" Disputes over textbooks, courses and curricula tend to be the most divisive and also
are the most difficult to resolve in constitutional terms, of all of the
types of decisions affecting the public schools discussed in this
article.
The governmental interest opposing individual first amendment claims in this area is of the highest order. Courses, curricula,
and textbooks constitute the heart of the educational program and
are the primary instruments by which the public schools carry out
their mission to educate youth. As much as eighty percent of instruction presented in public school comes from textbooks.23 7 State
law and regulations commonly impose standards, often very detailed, for the curriculum and course offerings. 23 8 About half the
states select textbooks by local school boards and the other half
select textbooks on a statewide basis; where statewide selection is
used, individual schools or teachers often have the option of selecting from a limited number of available titles. 239 Because of the
magnitude of the government interest at stake, courts have tended
to be very deferential to the school authorities in this area with the
exception of establishment clause issues. Perhaps the most convenient approach to the subject is to break the discussion down by the
types of claims advanced to challenge the school officials' decision
- establishment of religion, free exercise of religion, and freedom
of expression.
*.".

a.

Establishment of Religion

The Supreme Court has made it clear that efforts to use the
school curriculum for the inculcation of religious doctrine will not
236. Schember, Textbook Censorship - The Validity of School Board
Rules, 28 AD. L. REV. 259 (1976).
237. English, The Politics of Textbook Adoption, PHI DELTA KAPPAN 275
(Dec. 1980).

238. L. PETERSON, THE LAW AND PUBLIC SCHOOL OPERATION 321-34 (2d ed.
1978); E. REUTTER, THE LAW OF PUBLIC EDUCATION 107-14, 116-25 (1970).
239. Note, Textbook Adoption Laws, Precensorship,and the First Amendment: The Case Against Statewide Selection of Classroom Materials, 17 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 167, 168 nn.10, 11 (1984). Textbook selection has become a battleground for ideological forces competing for control of schools. Conservative
political and religious groups have successfully influenced textbook selection in
many instances. Id. at 169 nn.16-20, 170 nn.21-22; Rhode, Is Secular Humanism
the Religion of the Public Schools? DEALING WITH CENSORSHIP 117-19 (J. Dany ed.
1979). Liberal organizations also have campaigned for textbook changes. 11 COUNCIL ON INTERNATIONAL BOOKS FOR CHILDREN BULL.

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol10/iss3/1

8 at 7, 9 (1980).

38

1988]

Smith: Constitutional Rights of Students, Their Families, and Teachers i
FIRST AMENDMENT IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS

391

be tolerated. In School District of Abingdon v. Schempp,240 the
Court ruled that daily Bible reading as part of a school course of
instruction amounted to an unconstitutional establishment of religion. In Stone v. Graham, 41 the Court invalidated on establishment grounds a state requirement that the Ten Commandments be
posted in each schoolroom. In Epperson v. Arkansas242 the Court
determined that the state's prohibition of teaching evolution was
religiously motivated and hence violated the establishment clause.
The establishment clause applies fully to courses that subscribe to
the religious tenets of non-Christian religions; in Malnak v.
Yogi, 2 3 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals ordered the elimination

of a transcendental meditation course that included ceremonies involving offerings to a deity.
Louisiana was among several states that recently enacted "balanced treatment" legislation, forbidding the teaching of evolution
unless accompanied by instruction in creation science. The Supreme Court in Edwards v. Aguillard2 " invalidated the statute as
violative of the establishment clause. The stated purpose of the
law was to protect academic freedom. The Court observed that academic freedom was restricted, not advanced, by the statute, since
it compelled teachers to teach a theory with which they may not
agree or alternatively to remain silent about the entire subject clearly at odds with the "freedom of teachers to teach what they
will.

' 245

From the face of the statute the Court found it had a pre-

dominant religious purpose in violation of the first Lemon v.
Kurtzman test,246 its real purpose being to discredit " 'evolution by

counterbalancing its teaching at every turn with the teaching of
creation science ....
In reaching its conclusion, the Court first
noted that Louisiana had singled out evolution from among the
many scientific subjects for unique treatment.24 8 Next, it referred
to the historic and contemporaneous links between the teachings
of certain religious denominations and opposition to Darwinian
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

374 U.S. 203 (1963).
449 U.S. 39 (1980).
393 U.S. 97 (1968).
592 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1979).
107 S. Ct. 2573 (1987).
Id. at 2578.
See supra text accompanying notes 101-03.
Edwards, 107 S. Ct. at 2580 (citation omitted).
Id. at 2582.
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evolution.249 Then the Court observed that the statute favored creationism by requiring that curriculum guides be developed and research services supplied for that theory but imposing no similar
requirement with respect to evolution and by forbidding discrimination against one who teaches creationism but not one who
teaches evolution.25
The Supreme Court has stated expressly that religion can be
studied objectively in public schools by teaching its history, by examining the Bible and other religious texts as literature, and in
terms of comparative religion.2 5 The establishment clause is violated only when students are indoctrinated with religious beliefs,
when the values of one religious sect are preferred over those of
another sect, or when religious, as opposed to nonreligious, beliefs
are given preference.25
Just as the state cannot prefer religious beliefs over nonreligious beliefs, it also may not establish a "'religion of secularism
.. .preferring those who believe in no religion over those who do
believe.' ",253 The plaintiffs in Smith v. Board of School Commissioners25" contended that the state had done exactly that by adopt249. Id. at 2580-81.
250. Id. at 2579.
251. "[Ilt might well be said that one's education is not complete without a study of comparative religion or the history of religion and its relationship to the advancement of civilization. It certainly may be said that
the Bible is worthy of study for its literary and historic qualities. Nothing we have said indicates that such study of the Bible or of religion,
when presented objectively as part of a secular program of education,
may not be effected consistently with the First Amendment."

School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963). Even the Ten
Commandments could be an appropriate subject of study in a secular educational
program. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 42 (1980). Cf. Widmar v. Vincent, 454
U.S. 263, 271, 281 (Stevens, J., concurring) (1981) (where the potential for undue
influence is less significant at the college level than in high school, courses in religion and theology could be offered).
252. See supra text accompanying note 98.
253. School Dist. of Abington, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963).
254. 655 F. Supp. 939 (S.D. Ala. 1987), rev'd, 827 F.2d 684 (11th Cir. 1987).
This case was the outgrowth of Jaffree v. Board of School Comm'rs, 554 F. Supp.
1104 (S.D. Ala. 1983), where district judge Brevard Hand upheld the Alabama
"moment of silence" statute against a free exercise challenge, opining that the
Supreme Court had been in error for sixty years in holding that the First Amendment is applicable to the states. See Curtis, Judge Hand's History: An Analysis
of History and Method in Jaffree v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile
County, 86 W. VA. L. Rzv. 109 (1983). This decision was reversed by the Eleventh
Circuit, 705 F.2d 1526, which was affirmed by the Supreme Court, 472 U.S. 38
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ing textbooks that were biased in favor of secular humanism and
against traditional religion. The district court ruled in favor of the
plaintiffs, but the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed. The appellate court applied both the first, purpose, and
second, effects, Lemon tests to the home economics and social
studies books that the district court condemned. The court found
that the purpose behind the books was purely secular.2 The primary effect of the books did not convey a message of governmental
approval of secular humanism or disapproval of theism, and the
information presented was essentially neutral in religious content.256 The court further found that the home economics books
had an entirely appropriate secular effect by advocating such religiously neutral values as independent thought, tolerance of diverse
views, self-respect, maturity, self-reliance, and logical decisionmaking.257 The social science books did not have the effect of promoting secular humanism simply because historical facts concerning
religion were omitted or there was no thorough discussion of the
2 58
place of religion in modern society.

Viewed together, Edwards v. Aguillatd and Smith v. Board of
School Commissioners28 9 totally reject any notion, repeatedly advanced by some commentators,26 that the state has a duty under
the establishment clause to present balanced offerings of religious
and nonreligious theories or facts. Indeed, if the state undertakes
to do so, such an effort itself will violate the establishment clause if
(1985). In his initial decision, Judge Hand had indicated that if he were reversed
on his First Amendment view, he would undertake an examination of secular humanism as a religion in the public schools in violation of the church-state separation doctrine.
255. Smith, 827 F.2d at 694.
256. Id. at 690.
257. Id. at 692.
258. Id. at 693.
259. Plaintiffs contending that textbooks are part of a state-established religion have invariably lost. Wright v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 366 F.Supp.
1208 (S.D. Tex. 1972) (evolution); Willoughby v. Stever, 504 F.2d 271 (D.C. Cir.
1974) (evolution); Williams v. Board of Educ., 388 F. Supp. 93 (S.D. W. Va. 1975),
aff'd, 530 F.2d 972 (4th Cir. 1975) (Kanawha County textbook controversy, see
supra text accompanying note 236).
260. Emerson & Haber, The Scopes Case in Modern Dress, 27 U. CHi. L. REv.
522, 526-28 (1960); van Geel, supra note 235, at 290, 297; Yudof, When Governments Speak: Toward a Theory of Government Expression and the First
Amendment, 57 TEX. L. REV. 863, 884-88 (1979); Bird, supra note 167, at 542-43;
Stern, Challenging Ideological Exclusion of Curriculum Material: Rights of Students and Parents, 14 HARV. C.R. - C.L.L. REV. 485 (1979).
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it is religiously motivated. These cases represent a triumph for
school administrators. They are relatively unrestrained by the establishment clause in carrying out their critical task of making text
and course choices, provided they do not act with religious or antireligious purpose.
b.

Free Exercise of Religion

School children and their parents have maintained in several
cases that prescribed texts, courses, and curricula, typically in the
areas of evolution and sex education, violate their freedom of religion, and for that reason either they should be removed, the offending material should be deleted, or more balanced material
should be added.2 "
The religious minorities' claims based on conscientious objections to texts and courses are theoretically well-founded upon the
Sherbert-Thomas and Yoder lines of cases.2 2 A number of commentators have argued, in addition, that since many courses in politically, morally, and religiously controversial areas necessarily will
clash with, and tend to alter, the religious views of the minority, 6 3
school authorities have a duty under the first amendment free exercise clause to offer balanced presentations in which all views are
taught.26" These commentators draw an analogy to the Federal
Communications Commission's "fairness doctrine, ' 26 5 contending
that, because public schools dominate the field of education, teaching time becomes a limited and scarce resource that must be allocated fairly to represent opposing points of view. 6
Nevertheless, the free exercise claims of school families who
want changes made in texts and courses to resolve their religious
objections uniformly have been denied.26 7 The decisions adverse to
261. See Strossen, supra note 1, at 392-96.
262. See supra text accompanying notes 162-66. The imposition of evolution
in public schools is viewed as a state attack on fundamentalist religious views.
Bird, supra note 167, at 515; Rice, supra note 167, at 847.
263. See Note, Freedom of Religion and Science Instruction in Public
Schools, 87 YALE L.J. 515, 537 n.107 (1978).
264. See supra note 260.
265. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 395
U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (doctrine not only justified, but required by First
Amendment).
266. van Geel, supra note 235, at 289-92; Stern, supra note 260, at 508-13.
267. Williams v. Board of Educ., 388 F. Supp. 93 (S.D. W. Va. 1975), aff'd,
530 F.2d 972 (4th Cir. 1975) (Kanawha County textbook controversy, see supra
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those claims, unfortunately, are seldom accompanied by focused
discussions of the relevant constitutional values at stake. In Smith
v. Board of School Commissioners, 8 for example, the free exercise
claim, which in many respects was more compelling than the establishment claim, was dismissed in a footnote without discussion.
Even if they are not adequately reasoned, these cases are not necessarily wrongly decided, either by reason of constitutional theory
or practical considerations. The vital and often overlooked, but
sometimes perceived,2 69 countervailing constitutional consideration
is that to grant relief in such a case as this at the same time ordinarily results in a denial of teachers' academic freedom "to teach
what they will. 27 0° The practicalities also weigh heavily against
these claims. First, resolution of these claims is ill-suited to the
judicial process, because the courts would have to become deeply
involved in the complexities of course and book details. Second,
significant burdens would be placed on the school authorities,
teachers, and nondissenting students. Third, relief in the form of
excusing students from the offensive materials, rather than altering
them, would be far less disruptive to the education process and
nearly as satisfactory as far as the aggrieved students are
2 71

concerned.

c.

Freedom of Expression

In Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free School Disnote 236); Davis v. Page, 385 F. Supp. 395 (D.N.H. 1974); Cornwall v. State Bd.of
Educ., 314 F. Supp. 340 (D. Md. 1969), aff'd, 428 F.2d 471 (4th Cir. 1970) (per
curiam); Citizens for Parental Rights v. San Mateo School Bd., 51 Cal. App. 3d 1,
124 Cal. Rptr. 68 (1975), appeal dismissed, 425 U.S. 908 (1976); Hopkins v. Hamden Bd. of Educ., 29 Conn. Supp. 397, 289 A.2d 914 (1971), aff'd, 165 Conn. 793,
305 A.2d 536 (1973); Medeiros v. Kiyosaki, 52 Haw. 436, 478 P.2d 314 (1970);
Todd v. Rochester Community Schools, 41 Mich.App. 320, 200 N.W.2d 90 (1972);
Rosenberg v. Board of Educ., 196 Misc. 542, 92 N.Y.S.2d 344 (Sup. Ct. 1949) (objections to Oliver Twist and The Merchant of Venice as antiSemitic).
268. 827 F.2d 684, 695 n.12 (11th Cir. 1987). See supra text accompanying
notes 254-58.
269. Citizens for Parental Rights v. San Mateo School Bd., 51 Cal. App. 3d 1,
124 Cal. Rptr. 68 (1975); Todd v. Rochester Community Schools, 41 Mich. App.
320, 200 N.W.2d 90 (1972); Rosenberg v. Board of Educ., 196 Misc. 542, 92
N.Y.S.2d 344 (Sup. Ct. 1949); McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp.
1255, 1273 (E.D. Ark. 1982) ("balanced treatment" law).
270. Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S.Ct. 2573 (1987).
271. See supra text accompanying notes 191-213.
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the plurality opinion expressed doubt as to any application of the right of free expression to the school curriculum.
School officials "might well defend their claim of absolute discretion in matters of curriculum by reliance upon their duty to inculcate community values. ' 273 Since only four Justices joined in the
plurality opinion, and the positions of the other Justices were in
varying degrees more conservative than those who subscribed to
the plurality opinion with respect to constitutional limitations on
school boards' authority, it is reasonable to predict that a freedom
of expression challenge to selection of textbooks, curricula, and
courses would be virtually certain to fail in the high court. 274
In two lower court cases decided before Pico, teachers on academic freedom grounds successfully challenged decisions to remove
textbooks or courses.2 75 However, in the majority of cases they
were unsuccessful. 76 In the single post-Pico case on this point the
teacher lost her academic freedom claim of a right to require use of
a textbook disapproved by the school board.2 77
trict

v.

3.

Pico,272

Teachers' Lectures, Questions, and Assignments

As discussed above, decisions concerning textbook and course
selection are made sometimes on a statewide basis and sometimes
by local school boards.2 7 8 On the other hand, choices of lecture con272. 457 U.S. 853 (1982). See supra text accompanying notes 215-24.
273. Id. at 869 (emphasis in original).

274. Justice Blackmun, who concurred separately, agreed that curriculum decisions were reserved to the school authorities. Id. at 878 n.1. Pico cannot be logically limited to school libraries, and its reasoning applies with equal force to curriculum, according to some commentators. E.g., Note, supra note 229, at 136.
Regardless of this analysis, the Supreme Court votes for extending Pico to curricular decisions simply are not there.
275. Harris v. Mechanicville Cent. School Dist., 86 Misc. 2d 144, 382
N.Y.S.2d 251 (1976); Loewen v. Turnipseed, 488 F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. Miss. 1980).

The latter decision may still be good law since plaintiffs successfully proved that
the decision to exclude an award-winning history text was racially motivated,
thereby implicating equal protection values.
276. Cary v. Board of Educ., 598 F.2d 535 (10th Cir. 1979); Clark v. Holmes,
474 F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1972); Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Corp., 631 F.2d
1300 (7th Cir. 1980); Palmer v. Board of Educ., 603 F.2d 1271 (7th Cir. 1979). Cf.

Minarcini v. Strongville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976) (refusal of
school board to purchase requested texts upheld).
277. Fisher v. Fairbanks North Star Borough School Dist., 704 P.2d 213

(Alaska 1985).
278. See supra text accompanying notes 238-39.
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tents, supplementary reading materials and films, questions to the
class, assignments, and testing are traditionally within the discretion of individual teachers.2 79 Similarly, contents of student reports
and other assignments, responses to questions, and volunteered
comments in class, by their very nature, cannot be prescribed by
higher authority. These considerations of tradition and practicality
are consistent with an substantial measure of academic freedom
for teachers and students alike in the day-to-day classroom setting.
Despite the foregoing differences, the result must be the same
here as in other aspects of public school operation, on issues of
church-state separation. A religious exercise in class, like daily Bible reading '8" or prayer,28 ' is no less violative of the establishment
clause if done on the individual teacher's prerogative than if prescribed by the authorities for the entire school system.
As suggested in the Edwards v. Aguillard28 2 opinion, application of the establishment clause to a particular school problem
often will confer the incidental benefit of expanding teacher academic freedom. Moore v. Gaston County Board of Education,28 3 a
federal district court decision, provides an excellent example of
that process at work. A teacher was discharged for responding to a
student's question by expressing approval of Darwinian evolution
and agnosticism and challenging Biblical inerrancy. The court ordered the teacher's reinstatement on establishment clause
grounds.2 8
In the sensitive areas of religion, morality, and politics, the
teacher runs far less risk of violating students' first amendment
rights by presenting the subject matter in an objective way in
which varying points of view are discussed than by attempting to
indoctrinate the students to subscribe to set opinions. School classes are captive audiences; they are taught to respect their teachers;
they are immature; and they are highly susceptible to the influence
of their elders. Therefore, in order to protect students' rights to
279.

EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

593-94 (1970); Mail-

loux v. Kiley, 323 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Mass. 1971), aff'd, 448 F.2d 1242 (1st Cir.
1971); Sterzing v. Fort Bend Indep. School Dist., 376 F. Supp. 657, 662 (S.D. Tex.
1972), vacated and remanded, 496 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1974).
280. School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
281. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
282. 107 S. Ct. 2573 (1987). Accord Smith v. Board of School Comm'rs, 827
F.2d 684, 689-94 (11th Cir. 1987).
283. 357 F. Supp. 1037 (W.D.N.C. 1973).
284. Id. at 1043.
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hold their own views, " 5 teachers should not proselytize.2 86 Courts,
quite rightly, have held that academic freedom does not grant
teachers the right to propagandize their students.2 87 In order to
steer clear of propagandizing, a teacher need not conceal his own
views. He has a right to hold beliefs and make them known, even
controversial and unpopular beliefs. He goes too far only when he
says, "You must believe," not when he says, "I believe." The
teacher widens the margins of his academic freedom when he offers
objective explanations of opposing views as well as his own views.
To avoid indoctrination, the teacher can present competing views,
encourage students to express disagreement, subject all theories to
critical examination, allow students to select optional materials,
and ensure that grades are dependent not on any particular view
but instead on understanding diverse views. 8 In addition, an express disclaimer of any particular religious or other controversial
position can be published by the school.2 89 In short, the analytic
model, rather than the inculcative model, ° tends both to minimize friction with student religion and speech interests and to
maximize academic freedom. The occasional judge who orders, 9
and the occasional commentator who argues, 2 that topics of religion or morality must be altogether avoided in the public schools
are wrong.
If the teacher tries to impose religious positions, he risks viola285. Edwards, 107 S. Ct. at 2575; Bird, supra note 167, at 532. There is a
well-established constitutional right not to have to hold any particular belief on
any controversial subject. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976); Branti v. Finkel,
445 U.S. 507 (1980). See van Geel, supra note 235, at 260-61 (young person's autonomy should be preserved, so he can make decisions for himself upon reaching
adulthood).
286. Van Alstyne, supra note 67, at 856; Note, Schoolbooks, School Boards,
and the Constitution,80 COL. L. REV. 1092, 1109 (1980); Yudof, supra note 260, at
874-75.
287. James v. Board of Educ., 461 F.2d 566, 573-74 (2d Cir. 1972); Knarr v.
Board of School Trustees, 317 F. Supp. 832, 836 (N.D. Ind.), aff'd, 452 F.2d 649
(7th Cir. 1971); Burns v. Rovaldi, 477 F. Supp. 270 (D. Conn. 1979) (communist
urging fifth graders to prepare to "kick out the rich rotten bosses").
288. Strossen, supra note 1, at 383.
289. Id. Note, The ConstitutionalDimension of Student-Initiated Religious
Activity in Public High Schools, 92 YALE L.J. 499, 507 (1983).
290. See supra text accompanying notes 13-29.
291. Reed v. Van Hoven, 237 F. Supp. 48, 56 (W.D. Mich. 1965) (ordering no
projects be assigned on religious or irreligious topics such as "Why I Believe or
Disbelieve in Religious Devotions").
292. See Note, supra note 140, at 1223.
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tion of both the establishment and the free exercise clauses. If the
teacher tries to impose moral and political views, he risks the sort
of compelled conformity on subjects of public importance that
West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette condemns as a violation of freedom of expression.293 There is an exception of great
importance to the general rule. The teacher is within his rights to
inculcate those fundamental constitutional values - free suffrage,
democratic control of government, freedom of expression, fair procedures, and toleration and equal treatment of minorities - that
our national experience reveals are essential for all freedoms to be
enjoyed maximally. 9 4 In other words, teachers must be empowered
to inspire respect for these basic values in our system that operate
to ensure the very freedom of religion and expression that are enforceable as limitations on academic freedom. Thus, one court held
that a teacher could not be fired for teaching about the interests
and rights of racial minorities 9 5 any more than he could be discharged for advocating the maintenance of free elections, no matter how offensive these doctrines might be to idiosyncratic
dissenters.
As pointed out above, 9 the Supreme Court indicated it will
uphold state maintenance of uniformity of texts and courses
against academic freedom claims by teachers. The acceptance of
orthodoxy in this aspect of the public school instructional program
heightens the importance of enforcing respect for diversity in
teachers' choices of lecture materials, supplementary readings, and
other details of instruction. In this traditional area of teacher free
choice, academic freedom should be rigorously upheld. In the
words of Justice Brandeis, the best remedy is "more speech, not
enforced silence.

2 97

Most courts generally have protected faculties

from discharge and other sanctions imposed on account of their
(non-propagandistic) 98 classroom expressions. " Exceptions un293. West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
294. See Freeman, supra note 29, at 55.
295. Kingsville Indep. School Dist. v. Cooper, 611 F.2d 1109, 1113 (5th Cir.
1980).
296. See supra text accompanying notes 272-74.
297. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (concurring). The state
cannot suppress speech if further communication might avert the threatened
harm. Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 97 (1977).
298. See supra text accompanying note 287.
299. Mailloux v. Kiley, 323 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Mass.) aff'd, 448 F.2d 1242 (1st
Cir. 1971); Parducci v. Rutland, 316 F. Supp. 352 (M.D. Ala. 1970) (assigning
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derstandably have been made for speech that is completely outside
the scope of what the teacher is assigned to teach,"' that which is
indecent (taking into account its educational relevance and the age
and maturity of the students), 0 ' and that which is likely to bring
about disorder.320 Efforts toward formulating general standards of
protected academic expression, such as nebulous concepts of educational appropriateness, have not produced useful results.30 3 The
Vonnegut's "Welcome to the Monkey House" as outside reading); Wilson v.
Chancellor, 418 F. Supp. 1358 (D. Ore. 1976) (cannot ban communist visiting
speaker in political science class); Dean v. Timpson Independent School Dist., 486
F. Supp. 302 (E.D. Tex. 1979); Downs v. Conway School Dist., 328 F. Supp. 338
(E.D. Ark. 1971) (second grade "Think and Do" assignment in which students
made pictures critical of inoperative water fountain and dangerous incinerator);
Pratt v. Independent School Dist., 670 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1982); Webb v. Lake
Mills Community School Dist., 344 F. Supp. 791 (N.D. Iowa 1972); Beebee v. Haslett Pub. Schools, 66 Mich. App. 718, 239 N.W.2d 724 (1976). Cf. Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359 (1st Cir. 1969) (relying on procedural due process). Contra
Parker v. Board of Educ., 237 F. Supp. 222 (Md.), aff'd, 348 F.2d 464 (4th Cir.
1965) (per curiam) (Huxley's Brave New World assigned). Drown v. Portsmouth
School Dist., 451 F.2d 1106 (1st Cir. 1971); Adams v. Campbell County School
Dist., 511 F.2d 1242 (10th Cir. 1975). The teacher can be required to make at least
a minimum presentation of the prescribed curriculum. Palmer v. Board of Educ.,
603 F.2d 1271 (7th Cir. 1979); Cooley v. Board of Educ., 327 F. Supp. 454 (E.D.
Ark. 1971), vacated, 453 F.2d 282 (8th Cir. 1972). Of course, if the teacher conscientiously objects, he should be excused and a substitute provided. See supra text
accompanying note 194.
300. Ahern v. Board of Educ., 456 F.2d 399 (8th Cir. 1972); Fowler v. Board
of Educ., 819 F.2d 657 (6th Cir. 1987) (Pink Floyd movie on noninstructional
day); Robbins v. Board of Educ., 313 F. Supp. 642 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
301. Mercer v. Michigan State Bd. of Educ., 379 F. Supp. 580 (E.D. Mich.),
aff'd, 419 U.S. 1081 (1974) (upholding statute prohibiting instruction on methods
of contraception); Moore v. School Bd., 364 F. Supp. 355 (N.D. Fla. 1973) (questioned students about frequency of masturbation); Brubaker v. Board of Educ.,
502 F.2d 993 (7th Cir. 1974) (poem about free love, drugs, and Woodstock eighth grade); Mailloux v. Kiley, 323 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Mass.), aff'd 448 F.2d 1242
(1st Cir. 1971) (discussion of word "fuck" approved for high school classroom).
302. Ahern, 456 F.2d 399; Birdwell v. Hazelwood School Dist., 352 F. Supp.
613, 622 (E.D. Mo. 1972). As to the three foregoing exceptions, see supra text
accompanying notes 51-57.
303. Compare Mailioux, 323 F. Supp. 1387, 1391-92 (D. Mass. 1971) (relevant, used in good faith and regarded by experts as serving a serious educational
purpose) with Mailloux, 448 F.2d 1242, 1243 (1st Cir. 1971) (legitimate interests
of authorities are demonstrably sufficient to circumscribe a teacher's speech) and
Kingsville Indep. School Dist. v. Cooper, 611 F.2d 1109, 1113 (5th Cir. 1980) (substantial disruption overshadows the teacher's usefulness as an instructor) and
Smalls, supra note 66, at 556-57 (no protection for individual statements, questions, assignments, unless pattern or practice of suppression).
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preferable approach is to regard all faculty classroom expression to
be protected except for the abovementioned categories of irrelevance, indecency, and disorderly.
Student academic freedom in the context of participating in
classroom discussions and submitting written work has not been
the subject of litigation except for the Supreme Court's recent student newspaper case, Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier.3 0 4
Unfortunately, other interests and considerations present in that
case overwhelm the issue of student academic freedom with which
this article is concerned. The student newspaper in Hazelwood was
an integral part of the high school journalism course. The principal
had censored two articles, one containing personal accounts of
teenage pregnancy by students under assumed names and the
other concerning the effects of divorce on children, which included
interviews with students from divorced families. The majority
seized on the elastic concept of educational appropriateness, identified in the Pico case, 30 5 as a justification for content-based censorship. The Court rejected the idea that the school newspaper had
become a public forum, stating instead that its limited purpose
was a supervised learning experience for student journalists, so
that its contents are the subject of reasonable regulation. 06 It is
essential to recognize that students were not being punished for
speaking or prevented from speaking; the school merely made its
official publication unavailable for the republication of their views.
The Tinker case,30 7 where students were held to be able to wear
their own armbands as a form of silent protest, was far different
from Hazelwood and was readily distinguished by the Court. 08
Perhaps in a future case the Court will express what limits are to
be placed on the concept of educational appropriateness to avoid
excessive erosion of the domain protected by the first amendment.
Hazelwood is a striking instance of the abuse of settled journalistic
standard and deviation from sound educational policy by the
school authorities but probably not a departure from prevailing
first amendment doctrine by the Court.
304. 108 S. Ct. 562 (1988). The Court had indicated, however, in Tinker v.
Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969) that "word[s] spoken, in class
." by students are subject to first amendment protection.
305. Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist. v. Pico, 457 U.S.
853 (1982). See supra text accompanying note 222.
306. Hazelwood, 108 S. Ct. at 562.
307. Tinker, 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
308. Hazelwood, 108 S. Ct. at 562.
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ExtracurricularActivities

Extracurricular activities by their nature are inessential to the
primary educational mission of the school. Accordingly, the state's
interest in exerting control over the educational system is greatly
diminished in the area of extracurricular activities. Students and
faculty who must participate in the instructional program are not
compelled to take part in extracurricular events. They have the option of not participating or of becoming involved in alternative offcampus activities. Thus, individual first amendment claims with
regard to the extracurricular program do not possess the same
sense of urgency as when they arise out of the compulsory instructional process. The diminished interests on both sides of the question tend to be offsetting, with the result that establishment, free
exercise, and free expression claims relating to extracurricular activities tend to be resolved in much the same way as are such
claims in the context of assignments, lectures, and class colloquy
discussed above.
School prayers and religious meditation, even when undertaken outside the regular instructional program, are not sustainable under the establishment clause. The Supreme Court and lower
courts considered three statutes in Wallace v. Jaffree.3 0 9 A 1978
statute authorized a one-minute period of silence for meditation.
The district court upheld this law, and the plaintiffs did not appeal.3 1 A 1981 statute authorized a period of silence for meditation
or voluntary prayer. The Supreme Court voted six to three to invalidate this statute under the first Lemon v. Kurtzman test,3 11 determining that it had no secular purpose, since any secular purpose
could have been fully served by the 1978 enactment, and the addition of "or voluntary prayer" was deemed to have characterized
prayer as the favored purpose."' A 1982 statute authorized teachers to lead willing students in a prescribed prayer to God. The Supreme Court unanimously held this last enactment to be an unconstitutional establishment of religion. 13 Courts are deeply divided
309. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
310. Id. at 41. A similar statute was invalidated by May v. Cooperman, 780
F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1985), appeal dismissed for want of jurisdiction,108 S. Ct. 388
(1987), where from the legislative history, a religious purpose of enactment was
found. Contra Gaines v. Anderson, 421 F. Supp. 337 (D. Mass. 1976).
311. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). See supra text accompanying
notes 101-10.
312. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 59-60.
313. Id. at 38.
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in passing on the constitutionality of prayer and other religious expressions that occur at commencement exercises and on other occasions outside the school day.3 14
Just as in the outside world,3 15 the courts appear to be perplexed in dealing with challenges to religious symbols, music, art,
and holiday trappings that appear in the public schools. In Florey
v. Sioux Falls School District, 16 the Eighth Circuit upheld school
board rules permitting the observation of only those holidays that
have both a religious and secular basis; allowing music, art, and
drama having religious themes only if used in a "prudent and objective manner" and as a traditional part of the the cultural heritage; and authorizing religious symbols only as a temporary teaching aid or resource. The court's views concerning the third Lemon
test, entanglement, were, first, to suggest that the test perhaps is
not applicable at all, and, second, even if the test applied, the rules
steered the school clear of entanglement with religion.
This is a
crude and very result-oriented analysis.
One of the most vexing church-state issues, combining both
establishment and free expression problems, outside the curriculum, arises when a nonschool-sponsored student group seeks to
maintain a religious club under the same conditions as nonreligious
clubs are permitted to operate. Religious speech, of course, is as
fully protected as other speech. 18 By allowing clubs generally to
operate, the school has opened up a limited forum within which
content-based suppression ordinarily should not be tolerated. 1 9
The ultimate question is whether the school administration's concern for enforcement of the establishment clause is a sufficiently
compelling governmental interest to override students' free expression. The Supreme Court held in Widmar v. Vincent s20 that on a
314. Prayers enjoined: Graham v. Central Community School Dist., 608 F.
Supp. 531 (S.D. Iowa 1985); Doe v. Aldine Indep. School Dist., 563 F. Supp. 883
(S.D. Tex. 1982). Prayers upheld: Wiest v. Mt. Lebanon School Dist., 457 Pa. 166,
320 A.2d 362 (1974); Grossberg v. Deusebio, 380 F. Supp. 285 (E.D. Va. 1974);
Wood v. Mt. Lebanon Township School Dist., 342 F. Supp. 1293 (W.D. Pa. 1972).
315. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (creche in municipal park).
316. 619 F.2d 1311 (8th Cir. 1980).
317. Id. at 1318. This view appears inconsistent with Widmar v. Vincent, 454
U.S. 263, 272 n.11 (1981) (excluding religious exercises carries risk of excessive
entanglement by attempting to determine which speech constitutes religious
worship).
318. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 262, 269 (1981).
319. See supra text accompanying notes 40-48.
320. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
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college campus the religious club in this circumstance must be allowed to operate. A federal district court in Bender v. Williams" ' held that the same
port Area School District32
result is required
on public high school campuses. The Third Circuit reversed,32 2 because the immaturity of high school students made it likely that
they would regard school accommodation as amounting to school
sponsorship.3 23 The Supreme Court summarily dismissed the appeal,3 2 ' on a procedural point and not on the merits, so that the
district court opinion favorable to student rights was reinstated.
Congress attempted to resolve this controversy for meetings
outside the official school day by passing the Equal Access Act in
1984.325 The Act prohibits public secondary schools from denying
access during noninstructional hours to student meetings based on
the content of speech, where other "noncurriculum related student
groups" 326 have been offered the opportunity to meet. The Equal
321. 563 F. Supp. 697 (M.D. Pa. 1983).
322. 741 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1984). Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971
(2d Cir. 1981), a pre-Widmar case is in accord with the court of appeals in Bender
but on the theory that the high school is not a public forum. Also in agreement
with the court of appeals is Bell v. Little Axe Indep. School Dist., 766 F.2d 1391
(10th Cir. 1985), but there faculty members were initiators and participants in the
meetings. Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Indep. School Dist., 669 F.2d
1038 (5th Cir. 1982), also rules against this form of accommodation to student
goups, but there the school's policy was tailored to authorize student religious
groups and no others. See supra note 117. Also in agreement with the court of
appeals in Bender are Johnson v. Huntington Beach Union High School Dist., 68
Cal. App. 3d 1, 137 Cal. Rptr. 43 (1977); Hunt v. Board of Educ., 321 F. Supp.
1263 (S.D. W.Va. 1971); Trietley v. Board of Educ., 65 A.D.2d 1, 409 N.Y.S.2d 912
(1978); Commissioners of Educ., v. School Committee, 358 Mass. 776, 267 N.E.2d
226 (1971). Contra Reed v. Van Hoven, 237 F. Supp. 48 (W.D. Mich. 1965); May
v. Evansville-Vanderburgh School Corp., 615 F. Supp. 761, 766 (S.D. Ind. 1985),
aff'd, 787 F.2d 1105 (7th Cir. 1986). These cases are all prior to the Equal Access
Act of 1984, see infra text accompanying notes 325-332, and some of them likely
would now be decided differently.
323. Bender, 741 F.2d at 547-49.
324. 475 U.S. 534 (1986).
325. 20 U.S.C. § 4071 (Supp. III 1985).
326. Legislative history indicates that the Act relates only to meetings occurring before and after the official school day. 130 Cong. Rec. § S8353 (daily ed.
June 27, 1984) (statement of Sen. Hatfield), 130 Cong. Rec. § S8355-56 (daily ed.
June 27, 1984) (statement of Sen. Denton). Legislative history suggests that the
term noncurriculum related is to be defined broadly, that is, in favor of coverage
by the Act. Strossen, A Constitutional Analysis of the Equal Access Act's Standards Governing Public School Student Religious Meetings, 24 HARV. J. LEGIS.
117, 162 nn.176-78 (1987).
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Access Act reaches both religious and secular student meetings.
Because a single instance of access granted to another group will
trigger applicability of the Act, 27 it places much greater limitations on school authorities' discretion than current constitutional
doctrine, which would both require the establishment of a forum
for speech and permit the school officials to change or withdraw
the forum.2 8
The Equal Access Act provides that a school shall be deemed
in accordance with the law if it complies with five specified conditions: (1) meetings are "voluntary and student-initiated"; (2) there
is no government sponsorship; (3) any governmental employees
present at religious meetings are in a "non-participatory capacity";
(4) meetings do not interfere with the educational activities of the
school; and (5) nonschool persons may not "direct, conduct, control, or regularly attend activities of student groups." Although
neither the language of the statute nor the legislative history specifies whether these five conditions are mandatory, commentators
agree that they are. 32 9 If the foregoing criteria were not mandatory,
religious meetings in many instances would violate the establishment clause, as where faculty were permitted to participate. 30
The Equal Access Act significantly expands student free
speech rights. 3 1 It prefers the value of freedom of expression over
that of church-state separation, perhaps even to the extent that
certain applications of the statute could violate the establishment
33

clause.

2

Student free exercise (and right to silence, a component of free
speech)333 claims in extracurricular matters were settled long ago
by West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette,334 holding that
327. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(b) (Supp. III 1985). See Student Coalition for Peace v.
Lower Merion School Dist., 633 F. Supp. 1040 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
328. See supra text accompanying notes 40-49.
329. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(c) (Supp. III 1985). See supra Strossen, note 326, at
165 n.189.
330. Bell v. Little Axe Indep. School Dist., 766 F.2d 1391 (10th Cir. 1985).
331. Note, The Equal Access Act: A Haven for High School "Hate Groups"?
13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 589, 592 (1985).
332. See supra Strossen, note 326, at 178, 181. But see Thompson v. Waynesboro Area School Dist., 673 F. Supp. 1379, 1390 (M.D. Pa. 1987), drawing from
the legislative history of the Equal Access Act to support the conclusion that accommodation to religious free speech on a high school campus does not impermissibly advance religion for purposes of the establishment clause.
333. West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
334. Id.
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students cannot be compelled to participate in ceremonies that offend their consciences. Similarly, teachers are not subject to the
requirement of participating in extracurricular programs and exercises to which they are opposed. 3
Teachers and students are accorded a wide measure of academic freedom in noncurricular activities such as school plays.3
The Supreme Court carefully limited its opinion upholding limited
newspaper censorship
in Hazelwood School District v.
Kuhlmeier3 7 to school-owned newspapers which are integral parts
of journalism courses.3 38 The lower courts have decided a number
of cases involving the rights of students to circulate "underground"
and other unofficial publications. Some cases uphold students'
rights, 3 9 but others have enforced preclearance requirements, content standards (e.g., "pervasive vulgarity," defamation, invasion of
privacy), and time-place-manner restrictions.3 4
Both student and teacher academic freedoms in the extracurricular setting are subject to the same general limitations that are
noted elsewhere in this article. 341 Indecent speech can be suppressed, as it was with the Supreme Court's approval in Bethel
School District v. Fraser,34 2 where a student used sexually sugges335. Russo v. Central School Dist., 469 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1972). Cf. 20 U.S.C.
§ 4071(d)(4), Equal Access Act provision that school employees shall not be required to attend meetings where the contents of speech are contrary to their
beliefs.
336. Webb v. Lake Mills Community Schools Dist., 344 F. Supp. 791 (N.D.
Iowa 1972) (play would be given, to which authorities objected because of the
words "son of a bitch" and "damn"); Bowman v. Bethel-Tate Bd. of Educ., 610 F.
Supp. 577 (S.D. Ohio 1985); Bell v. U-32 Bd. of Educ., 630 F. Supp. 939 (D. Vt.
1986) (upholding authorities' decision not to sponsor school play that was "indecent" and psychologically unsuitable); Seyfried v. Walton, 668 F.2d 214 (3d Cir.
1981) (play with sexual theme inappropriate).
337. 108 S. Ct. 562 (1988).
338. Id. at 571.
339. Scoville v. Board of Educ., 425 F.2d 10 (7th Cir. 1970) (en banc); Quarterman v. Byrd, 453 F.2d 54 (4th Cir. 1971); Eisner v. Stamford Board of Educ.,
440 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1971); Hall v. Board of School Comm'rs, 681 F.2d 965 (5th
Cir. 1982) (unlimited prior approval regulations invalidated); Thompson v.
Waynesboro Area School Dist., 673 F. Supp. 1379 (M.D. Pa. 1987) (striking down
restrictions of school distribution of religious literature to areas outside the
schoolhouse).
340. Bystrom v. Fridley High School, 822 F.2d 747 (8th Cir. 1987); Sullivan v.
Houston Indep. School Dist., 475 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir. 1973)..
341. See supra text accompanying notes 51-57 and 300-302.
342. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
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tive speech in a school assembly. Likewise, extracurricular programs apt to result in disorder may properly be cancelled. 4 3
D.

Postscript on ProceduralDue Process

In Pico 4 4 the Supreme Court plurality said that the case
would have been different if the school board had established and
carried out regular and facially unbiased procedures for review of
controversial library books.3 4 5 A number of cases have faulted
school officials' decisions on procedural due process grounds, such
as when teachers were dismissed without advance warning that
teaching particular materials was forbidden,3 4 6 when textbook selections took place without receiving the views of interested parties,3 47 and in various other contexts. 48
If fair procedures exist for the determination of disputes over
library contents, textbooks, assignments, and other areas of controversy within the school program, a great many potential constitutional lawsuits will be resolved. Also, the availability of some form
of administrative hearing may result in the production of a record
for review and clarification of issues before the court in those controversies that do proceed to litigation. The practical advantages of
a reasonable system of procedures thus are enormous.34 9
Nevertheless, first amendment disputes in public education
343. Silmitz v. Maine School Admin. Dist. No. 59, 495 A.2d 812 (Me. 1985)
(authorities could cancel "tolerance day" program, including homosexual's speech,
after bomb threats received).
344. Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist. v. Pico, 457 U.S.
853 (1982). See supra text accompanying notes 215-29.
345. Id. at 874.
346. Stachura v. Truszowski, 763 F.2d 211, 215 (6th Cir. 1985), rev'd in part
on other grounds, 477 U.S. 299 (1986) (teacher terminated for teaching sex education class with approved text, film, and teaching methods); Scheck v. Baileyville
School Comm., 530 F. Supp. 679 (D.Me. 1982); Sterzing v. Fort Bend Independent
School Dist., 376 F. Supp. 657 (S.D. Tex. 1972), vacated for reconsiderationof
relief, 496 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1974); Mailloux v. Kiley, 436 F.2d 565 (1st Cir. 1971).
347. Loewn v. Turnipseed, 488 F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. Miss. 1980).
348. Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1269 (D.N.H. 1979)
(board's failure to follow its own rules in removing Ms. magazine from library).
349. Bartlett, The Iowa Model Policy and Rules for Selection of Institutional Materials DEALING WITH CENSORSHIP 202 (J. Davis ed. 1979); Donelson,
Censorship in the 1970's: Some Ways to Handle It When It Comes (And it Will),
DEALING WITH CENSORSHIP 165 (J. Davis ed. 1979); Hunter, supra note 79, at 7577; Comment, Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free School District No.
26 v. Pico, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 561, 576-81 (1984).
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implicate substantive constitutional rights of crucial importance.
Under established precedent, the claimants of individual constitutional rights must have the opportunity to try their substantive
of whether fair administrative proceclaims in court, regardless
3 50
applied.
been
have
dures
V.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court has developed a number of specific rules.
These rules directly apply to many areas of conflict among competing constitutional claims in public education.
Claims relating to the establishment of religion are now largely
resolved. The Court's decisions in School District of Abington v.
Schempp, Edwards v. Aguillard, and Wallace v. Jaifree make it
plain that official advocacy of religion by means of textbooks,
course materials, extracurricular activities, and other parts of the
school program will not be tolerated. The unresolved establishment clause issues of current importance are whether secular humanism is to be regarded as a state-sponsored substitute for religion and whether nonschool-sponsored religious groups should be
accorded the same status as other voluntary student organizations.
Religious free exercise claims of those who wish to withdraw
from public education into private or parochial schools or home
education are fully protected under Pierce v. Society of Sisters.
Also, the state is precluded to a considerable extent from imposing
its general educational regulations on religious schools. Religious
free exercise claims of students who remain in the public schools
ought to be accommodated by excusing them and permitting the
use of alternative materials and courses of study, and although the
Sherbert-Thomas doctrine and the Yoder case indicate this is a
constitutionally-mandated measure, it is by no means clear how
controversies in this area will be finally resolved. The alternative
approach of accommodating free exercise claims by eliminating
books, courses, and other materials has an unacceptable adverse
impact on the academic freedom of nondissenting teachers and
students.
The Pico case stands for the proposition that school authorities may not remove books from school library shelves for impermissible ideological reasons, but they are under no constitutional
limitations with respect to library acquisitions. Even though the
350. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 599 (1972).
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Court was badly divided and did not produce a majority opinion in
Pico, the decision seems to have calmed what had been a raging
controversy about school libraries.
Because the state has such a powerful interest in maintaining
uniformity in the prescribed course of study, neither religious freedom nor free expression claims will be granted to dictate additions
to, or deletions from, textbooks, courses, and curricula.
On the other hand, the academic freedom of teachers and students should create a zone of protection against encroachment by
school authorities in matters of lectures, class questions, and discussions, supplementary materials, assignments, and testing. The
Supreme Court has not provided definitive rules for this part of
the school program, except to hold in Barnette that students may
not be forced to affirm or subscribe to beliefs against their will.
However, the lower courts, by clear consensus, are protective of academic freedom in this area, other than for materials that are indecent, productive of disorder, or entirely outside the scope of the
subject matter under study.
Because both school administrators and students have interests in extracurricular activities with somewhat diminished importance, which tend to be mutually offsetting, claims in this context
are generally resolved in accordance with the same rules that apply
in the day-to-day classroom setting.
In unclear situations, the school officials and the courts should
opt in favor of more speech and expanded debate, rather than the
suppression of expression. Schools are expected to inculcate students with widely accepted community values. If the schools seek
to place the greatest emphasis on those values that are consistent
with our free and participatory style of government - values including free speech, voting rights, procedural fairness, and toleration of religious and other minorities - the analytic mode of instruction becomes the accepted method of presenting controversial
subjects. The analytic mode, by means of critical and broad inquiry, debate, and objective analysis, serves to expand academic
freedom and at the same time avoids the establishment of religion
and minimizes both religious and free speech conscientious
objection.
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